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The information society that presides today is dependent on the communication in-
dustry to facilitate unintelligible data transfers between authenticated parties. Such
requirements have, to date, taken advantage of security based on the mathematical
complexities of certain algorithms. However, the advancement of computing power and
the advent of the quantum computer together with the vulnerability of this scheme to
mathematical progress have prompted the introduction of quantum cryptography. This
process, through the laws of quantum physics, ensures provably secure data communi-
cation.
Quantum cryptography provides physical protection to individual bits of information
thus providing a hardware implemented solution. The implementation of this theoreti-
cal concept requires much practical innovation for transparent deployment into current
cryptographic solutions.
This thesis introduces the concept of quantum cryptography in a practical perspec-
tive. It raises a few core concerns with the present quantum cryptographic technology
and provides some solutions towards the practical deployment of commercially feasible
quantum cryptographic systems.
The thesis commences with an introduction to classical cryptography focussing on key
management protocols. This is followed by the presentation of the basic concepts of
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) together with an explanation of some QKD protocols
and parameter required to classify such protocols. Chapter 2 discusses the theoretical
and practical aspects of quantum channels in particular optical fibre. The primary chal-
lenges of transferring classical and quantum data along these channels are mentioned
together with some solutions.
A description of experimental usage with present QKD solutions is presented in Chap-
ter 3. An investigation into highly efficient QKD protocols follows illustrating effective
post-distribution processing for increasing the efficiency of the BB84 protocol.
Chapter 4 begins with the limitations of present day QKD systems and explicates Quan-
tum Networks as a possible solution. An introduction to classical networking theory
is first presented after which some quantum network architectures based on passive
optical networks are illustrated. Finally the proposed Quantum City project in con-
junction with the eThekwini Municipality is explained. The realization of this project
is intended to be complete by the third quarter of 2008 effectively making Durban into
the first Quantum City in the world.
ii Abstract
PREFACE
The work described in this Masters thesis was carried out at the School of Physics, Uni-
versity of KwaZulu-Natal, Westville Campus, from the period commencing February
2007 to June 2008, under the supervision of Professor Francesco Petruccione.
These studies represent original work by the author and have not otherwise been sub-
mitted in any form for any other degree or diploma to any other tertiary institution.
Where use has been made of the work of others it is duly acknowledged in this text.
iv Abstract
CONTENTS
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 The Need for Cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Classical Cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2.1 The Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2.2 Substitutional Cipher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2.3 One Time Pad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2.4 The Eavesdropper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.2.5 Classical Methods of Key Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.2.6 Asymmetric Key Cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.2.7 Symmetric Key Cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.3 Quantum Key Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.3.1 The Basis of Security in QKD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.3.2 The Photon as a Qubit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.3.3 Quantum Random Number Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.3.4 BB84 Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.3.5 Essential Parameters of QKD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2. Quantum Channels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.1 Types of Quantum Channels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.2 Shannon’s Coding Theorems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.3 Optical Fibre as a Quantum Channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.4 Fibre Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.4.1 The Propagation of Light in Optical Fibres . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.4.2 Polarization Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.4.3 Dispersive Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.5 Polarization to Phase Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3. Quantum Key Distribution in Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.1 id3000 Clavis QKD System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.1.1 Principle of operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.1.2 A Comparison of the Randomness of Numbers Generated through
Classical and Quantum Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.2 An Alternate QKD Protocol for a BB84 Cryptosystem Apparatus . . . 36
3.2.1 Singapore Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.2.2 IKE implemented on the BB84 Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
vi Contents
3.2.3 Experimental Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4. Quantum Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.1 Classical Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.1.1 Network Layers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.1.2 Multiplexing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.2 Quantum Network Architectures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.2.1 Classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.2.2 Different architectures and topologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4.2.3 Plug & Play Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.2.4 eThekwini Municipal Quantum Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
5. Intended Research on Quantum Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
6. Summary and Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
7. Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
7.1 Appendix A - List of Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
LIST OF TABLES
1.1 An example of a substitutional cipher. The session key is added in a
letter-wise modular fashion to the plaintext to create the final ciphertext.
A character frequency analysis can be executed to retrieve the key and
hence the plaintext. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2 This table demonstrates the digital OTP cyptosystem. The plaintext is
encrypted through a bitwise XOR function with the key while decryption
is again conducted by an XOR between the ciphertext and key. It should
be noted that the key length is required to be at least as long as the
plaintext as this is a stream cipher. As the key is a random sequence of
bits, the ciphertext produced is also a random sequence. . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3 Alice may send four different qubit states. These comprise of two non-
orthogonal modes, each containing a pair of orthogonal states. The states
are assigned binary values such that each mode consists of the complete
binary set. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.1 A comparison between two of the most widely used quantum channels
for QKD. Each channel is suited for particular usage and as such a global
quantum network would require the integration of all such channels to
optimize the throughput of the network. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.2 Alice may send four different qubit states interpreted as phases. Note
again that she has a choice of 2 non-orthogonal modes, each with 2 or-
thogonal states. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.3 Eight emission/measurement permutations occur. For each state sent by
Alice, Bob may measure the qubit in the correct or incorrect basis thus
giving rise to deterministic or probabilistic results respectively. The ‘?’
below in the table represent probabilistic result from which no key bit
can be produced in the BB84 protocol. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.1 Phase selection permutations in the BB84 Protocol. . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.2 Test results from the diehard random number tests indicate the a greater
uniformity of p-values, hence randomness, of the quantum generated key
stream when compared to classically generated random numbers. . . . . 37
3.3 The detection probabilities for each detector in the Singapore protocol
as per the phase selection of Alice. Each phase selection of Alice disal-
lows a click on unique detector, while the detection probabilities on the
remaining detectors are equal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
viii List of Tables
3.4 The detection probabilities of the proposed enhanced BB84 protocol has
the same core property permitting the IKE process. Each phase selection
by Alice induces a zero detection probability on a unique detector. The
remaining detectors have a symmetric detection probability although to
equal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.5 Due to technical reasons, the physical detectors have an asymmetric de-
tection visibility. The theoretical detection probabilities of Bob, induced
by Alice’s phase choices, is thus modified and presented here. It is noted
that probabilities still posses the unique property required for IKE. . . . 41
3.6 The experimental detection probabilities of the photon detectors corre-
spond closely to the predicted values. In particular the disallowed states,
essential for the IKE process in the enhance BB84 protocol, are maintained. 42
3.7 An analysis of the key sifting cycles in the enhanced BB84 protocol shows
that an increase of almost 40% in the efficiency is achieved through five
cycles of the IKE as compared to the original BB84 protocol. . . . . . . 42
LIST OF FIGURES
1.1 The process through which information is transferred securely over public
channels is known as cryptography. A sender encrypts the data such that
it is unintelligible to onlookers while the intended recipient decrypts the
message to reconstruct an intelligible message. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 During a cryptographic session, the encryption and decryption algorithms
are selected through the choice of a key. The plaintext, P, is then en-
crypted and decrypted at the entry and exit points of the channel respec-
tively. Prior to the actual cryptographic session, a key is required to be
exchanged between the parties. Eve would require the key in order to
know which particular transformation was used. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3 A diagram representing the roles of Alice, Bob and Eve in a quantum
cryptographic setup. Due the physical properties of the quantum infor-
mation, Eve is unable to access the key. As the information is encrypted
in through the OTP scheme, the information is provably secure. . . . . . 12
1.4 A schematic diagram of a quantum random number generator. Single
photons are emitted by the source, these photons then pass through a
50/50 beam-splitter (BS). The photons are randomly routed between the
two detectors with an overall probability of 1/2 to each detector. Due to
the quantum nature of the photon, the photon can be spilt and routed to
both detectors simultaneously but can only be measured at one detector. 14
1.5 Polarization states that may be sent by Alice in the BB84 protocol. Note
that each mode has two orthogonal states corresponding to the key bit
values. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.6 A photon sent and measured in a common basis by Alice and Bob will
result in a deterministic measurement. Bob will measure the exact po-
larization the photon was sent in and thus a key bit may be produced
from such a qubit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.7 A photon sent and received in unmatched bases will produce a proba-
bilistic result. Bob will measure either a 0 or 1 randomly, thus a key bit
can not be produced from such a measurement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.8 Due to an eavesdropper’s interception of qubits during the distribution
process, 25% of the qubits measured in the correct basis by Bob contain
errors. These qubits constitute 12.5% of the total qubits measured by Bob. 18
x List of Figures
2.1 The absorbtion spectrum of optical fibre. Attenuation at smaller wave-
lengths is due to phonon absorbtion while larger wavelengths are absorbed
through infrared absorbtion. This coupled with Rayleigh back scattering
and O-H absorbtion producing three attenuation minima known as the
transmission bands. Adapted from [1]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.2 A schematic diagram of a Mach-Zehnder interferometer. The pulse is split
at the first coupler and travels through both arms of the interferometer.
In each arm a phase differential is added. As the lengths of the arms are
identical, the pulses reach the second coupler at the same point in time.
Upon recombining interference occurs and the photon is routed to the
detectors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.3 A Schematic diagram of the phase-encoded BB84 protocol setup. Alice
may choose 1 of 4 phase shifts corresponding to her mode and state choice
while Bob has 2 choices of measurement modes. The nett phase between
the pulses routes the photon to a particular detector. . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.1 A schematic diagram illustrating the setup for the phase encoded auto-
compensating BB84 protocol. This setup is characterized by the use of
a single interferometer and a Faraday Mirror (FM). A variable attenu-
ator (VA) reduces the classical pulses to photon levels while the phase
modulators (PM) acts to select the modes and states of transmission and
measurement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.2 This figure illustrates when phase shifts are added to the pulses in the
Plug & Play QKD scheme. Figure 3.2(a) depicts the classical pulses being
sent to Alice with no encoded information. In figure 3.2(b) the pulses are
attenuated to single photon level, polarization switched to orthogonal
state and a phase shift added to P2. While in the interferometer in the
return trip, a phase shift is added to P1 in the long arm as depicted in
figure 3.2(c). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.3 A graph illustrating the detector count summary as per the phase selec-
tion permutations given in Table 3.1. It is seen that common mode mea-
surements result in deterministic results. Detector 2 received a greater
number of photon detections in the uncorrelated measurements due to a
higher interference visibility. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
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1. INTRODUCTION
Throughout time information has been gathered, stored and communicated in various
forms. The earliest means of information was visual, through diagrams and pictures.
Languages were then developed and text became the major means of information man-
agement. This continued until the information revolution in the early 20th century with
the advent of the digital age. Electronic media propelled our society into an information
driven society, however this has come with many complications, one being that of data
integrity, privacy and secrecy [2].
Prior to the 20th century, physical security was sufficient to protect sensitive informa-
tion. A classical example is that of the Ancient Greeks’ Scytale which was used to store
and communicate information to army generals [3]. A long strip of writing material
was coiled around rod of particular radius at a specific angle such that there was no
overlapping of the material. The information was then written on it and uncoiled. Only
those with a rod of the same radii would be able to retrieve intelligible information
from the script. However these security schemes required radical improvements as data
exchange increased exponentially with the advent of the information age.
1.1 The Need for Cryptography
We currently live in a society that is inherently dependent on information. It is a vi-
tal resource in the political, commercial, private and academic sectors. The advent of
digital communication has brought with it a plethora of initiatives in the field of infor-
mation science. Electronic banking via an ATM or a cellphone, emails, intranets and the
internet now form the pivotal basis of commerce and industry. Information processing
devices provide automated services, serve as data analysis tools and information stor-
age devices while also facilitating the communication of information. However, in such
activities information privacy and communication secrecy are of core concern. With
electronic information processing and data storage, physical security at storage facili-
ties cannot imply total security, and hence privacy, of the information [4].
Physically protecting information as in storing information in a secret volt or transport-
ing documents in a highly armored entourage is an obscurity and deterrent to accessing
the information. Thus once an adversary has infiltrated or bypassed such measures,
they have total control over the information. However, information security requires
that even if an adversary possess complete knowledge of the protection measures they
would not be able to retrieve any information [4]. For such security, methods beyond
the classical domain must be explored.
2 1. Introduction
This thesis intends to expound on present cryptographic methods highlighting the limi-
tations therein. An introduction to quantum cryptography follows with a explanation of
various implementations of quantum cryptographic protocols. The workings of practi-
cal quantum cryptographic systems is then presented together with recent experiments
data. Further improvements in the sifting efficiency of currently used quantum protocols
is suggested. The increase in efficiency is realized through post-distribution processing.
A second generation of quantum cryptographic solutions involving quantum networks
are is presented in order to overcome some of the limitations of presently available quan-
tum security solutions. Finally the implementation of a Quantum network implemented
over the eThekwini Municipality optical fibre infrastructure is presented.
1.2 Classical Cryptography
1.2.1 The Problem Statement
Sensitive data is generally required to be communicated between spatially separated
regions or stored for extended periods of time such that any individual who infiltrates
the external protection measures acquires unintelligible, and hence useless, data. Such
protection can be realized through cryptography. This is the art of rendering one’s mes-
sages unintelligible to any adversary. The converse is known as cryptanalysis [2] which
is the study and practice of breaking cryptographic techniques. The ongoing tousle
between cryptography and cryptanalysis provides the propulsion for improvements in
information security [2].
Suppose the sender, commonly known as Alice, would like to transmit a message to
the receiver, known as Bob, securely from any onlooker. Alice and Bob will use an
algorithm, known as a cryptosystem, to convert the original information, the plaintext,
to its disguised form, known as ciphertext. This procedure is illustrated in Figure 1.1.
The process by which information is converted from plaintext to ciphertext is called
encryption, while the reverse procedure is named decryption. The total looped process
may be mathematically represented as [4]:
P = D(E(P )) (1.1)
where P is the plaintext, E is your encryption algorithm and D is your decryption
algorithm.
Together with protecting the information content of the message, cryptography also
assists in [4]:
Data integrity
This permits the receiver to verify that the content of the message was not altered
during transmission. Altering the information would permit the adversary to
forward false information to the receiver thereby controlling the knowledge flow
between the users.
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Encryption DecryptionPlaintext PlaintextCiphertext
Fig. 1.1: The process through which information is transferred securely over public channels is
known as cryptography. A sender encrypts the data such that it is unintelligible to on-
lookers while the intended recipient decrypts the message to reconstruct an intelligible
message.
Sender authentication
The receiver is able to confirm that the message was truly sent from the stated
sender. An adversary tapping into the communication channel between the users
and posing as the sender or receiver to Bob and Alice respectively would again
have full control of the information flow.
Non-repudiation of origin
At some future time the sender should not be able to falsely deny having sent
information to the receiver. This serves as an electronic receipt should there be
any future discrepancies.
A cryptographic scheme utilizes an algorithm to encrypt and decrypt information. These
algorithms form a family T of transformations Tk. Each transformation may be uniquely
defined through the choice of parameters known as the key. The keyspace K is the set
of all possible keys for a particular family of algorithms [4], thus
T = {Tk : k ∈ K}, (1.2)
and
Ek, Dk ∈ T. (1.3)
Therefore we have for a specific cryptosystem session
P = Dk(Ek(P )). (1.4)
Equation (1.4) is illustrated in Figure 1.2. The key selects a particular transformation
from the family T to be used in the cryptosystem. Thus even if the general algorithm is
known to the adversary, the information will not be compromised until the key, or a por-
tion thereof, is acquired. The eavsdropper may however acquire some knowledge of the









Fig. 1.2: During a cryptographic session, the encryption and decryption algorithms are selected
through the choice of a key. The plaintext, P, is then encrypted and decrypted at the
entry and exit points of the channel respectively. Prior to the actual cryptographic
session, a key is required to be exchanged between the parties. Eve would require the
key in order to know which particular transformation was used.
In the nineteenth century Dutchman A Kerckhoffs postulated that any cryptographic
system must implement the following [2]:
• The system should be unbreakable in practice.
• Compromising the algorithm should not compromise the system, hence the total
secrecy should be embedded within the key.
• The algorithm should be easy to memorize, implement and change.
• The ciphertext should be transferable by telegraph.
• The apparatus should be portable.
• The system should be user-friendly.
Cryptographic systems that are unbreakable in practice are referred to as Computation-
ally Secure [5]. In such cases the information is regarded secure if the cost and time
of cryptanalysis is greater than the value and validity of the information respectively.
Such systems are bound by technological and academic advancements.
A compromise in the algorithm refers to the leakage of the transformation set T used
in the cryptosystem to unauthorized individuals. For a robust cryptosystem, the leak
will not compromise the system as the security is provided by the key and this, in
turn, is chosen randomly and secretly. As each transformation Tk is rendered unique
through the choice of a key, the algorithm will also be a random selection of the set
T . Thus key distribution plays an integral role in the security of cryptographic process.
Cryptographic systems that require the algorithms to remain secret are referred to as
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Restricted Algorithms [6]. These are not practical for use in the public domain.
The ciphertext is required to be such that transfer over public media and communication
lines is possible. As this will permit the interception of the ciphertext, this point illudes
to the imperative requisite of cryptography that requires information to be secured
rather than obscured. This is as obscurity provides a deterrent from eavesdropping on
the data while security provides protection to the data.
1.2.2 Substitutional Cipher
One of the earliest cryptographic systems involves the modular addition of the alphabets.
A classic example of such a cipher is the Caesar Cipher used by Julius Ceaser in 100BC
to communicate with his generals [3]. Each alphabet was given a value from 0 to 25.
A pre-distributed key, consisting of a single value, was then used to perform a letter-
wise modular addition with the alphabets of the plaintext to create the ciphertext. An
example of this scheme is illustrated in Table 1.1:
Tab. 1.1: An example of a substitutional cipher. The session key is added in a letter-wise
modular fashion to the plaintext to create the final ciphertext. A character frequency
analysis can be executed to retrieve the key and hence the plaintext.
Plaintext: C r y p t o g r a p h y
ASCII: 02 17 24 15 19 14 06 17 00 15 07 24
Session key: 65
ASCII: 17 07 14 05 09 04 21 07 15 05 22 14
Ciphertext: R h o f j e v h p f w o
This method was however shown to be flawed by Al-Khindi [2]. Any intelligible plaintext
possesses a character frequency signature. Thus with the substitution method described
above, one may be able to derive the plaintext through a character frequency analysis.
This method is, however, dependent on side-information regarding the output probabil-
ity of the plaintext source in order to determine the character frequency signature.
By calculating the character frequency and mapping it onto a model of the plaintext
source, the key may be deduced. This may easily be done on a PC today.
To remove the frequency characteristics of the plaintext, it was split into smaller seg-
ments of a fixed predetermined size. A unique session key was then allocated to each
block. This method was termed the block cipher algorithm [5]. The trade-off for greater
security in this method came at the expense of utilizing larger keys. The key length
required increased linearly with the message size and inversely with the block size.
1.2.3 One Time Pad
The block cipher was modified in 1586 to remove the dependance of the key length
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on the plaintext size, this was known as the Vigenére cipher [5]. In this scheme the
plaintext was again split into fixed size blocks. A key of length equal to the block size
was used to conduct a character-wise modular addition within the block. The same key
was then reapplied in a similar fashion to encrypt the remaining blocks of the plaintext.
Thus the key length was merely a function of the block size. However, the reuse of the
key for each block creates a security breach as, with additional side information, the
key may be determined [7].
To increase the security of such a system, the block size is increased. This reduces the
number of times the key is reused and increases the number of permutations of the key.
Joseph O Mauborgne and Gilbert Vernam in 1926 developed the limiting case of such
a block cipher where the block size, and hence the key, was as large as the plaintext
itself. This cryptosystem is known as the One Time Pad (OTP) [4]. This method is
referred to as a stream cipher where each character of the plaintext is encrypted with
a unique key bit. For implementation into the digital media modular addition, central
to this encryption scheme, is extended to a bitwise XOR of the key and plaintext. A
illustration of the OTP cryptosystem is presented in Table 1.2.
Tab. 1.2: This table demonstrates the digital OTP cyptosystem. The plaintext is encrypted
through a bitwise XOR function with the key while decryption is again conducted by
an XOR between the ciphertext and key. It should be noted that the key length is
required to be at least as long as the plaintext as this is a stream cipher. As the key
is a random sequence of bits, the ciphertext produced is also a random sequence.
Plaintext: 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
OTP key: 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1
Ciphertext: 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0
The OTP cryptosystem is characterized by the following [2]:
• The sequence of key bits is generated in a truly random manner.
• The key size is as long as the plaintext.
• The key is used exactly once.
Truly random numbers are generated through random processes as opposed to pseudo-
random numbers that are generated through a deterministic algorithm and environment
specific seed variables [8]. Due to their deterministic nature, pseudorandom numbers
exhibit patterns as each number is dependent on the former and hence the key may be
reverse engineered through the use of sufficient computing power.
Two sets of plaintext codes, P1 and P2, encrypted with a common key in a Vigenére
cryptosystem produce the ciphertext C1 and C2 through the binary modular addition
operator ⊕. However this set of ciphertexts are prone to cryptanalysis as
C1 ⊕ C2 = (P1 ⊕ k)⊕ (P2 ⊕ k) = (P1 ⊕ P2)⊕ (k ⊕ k) = P1 ⊕ P2, (1.5)
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where the commutative property of the XOR funtion has been used.
With further side information about the plaintext, an eavesdropper may be able to de-
cipher the text. Thus the key is required to be as long as the plaintext and used only
once. Any successful attack on the OTP cryptosystem would involve an attack on the
key. Thus to preserve long-term secrecy, the key bits are also required to be stored or
destroyed in a safe manner.
It was shown in 1948 by CE Shannon in his paper Communication Theory of Secrecy
Systems [9] that OTP was a provably secure method of data encryption. He further
stated that any provably secure scheme must necessarily comply with the above crite-
ria. Such cryptosystems are independent of an adversary’s computational power and
mathematical advancements.
As a random key renders any sequence again random and every key sequence is be
equally probable, the ciphertext has equal probability of being any permutation of bits
to the length of the plaintext. As an example, the ciphertext corresponding to ‘Quan-
tum’ could equally be ‘Jpanmwi ’ or ‘Physics’. Thus the probability of cryptanalysis of
the ciphertext is equal to the probability of acquiring the original plaintext directly [7],
Prob(P,C) = Prob(P ). (1.6)
The only cryptanalysis technique that can be employed to break such a system is a
brute force attack where every possible permutation of the key is required to be tested
[4].
As one may note, the secure distribution of the key will imply a secure encryption. Thus
key distribution and management is integral to the success of this scheme.
1.2.4 The Eavesdropper
An eavesdropper, commonly known as Eve, is an unauthorized party that attempts to
intercept and extract information from the communications between two legitimate com-
municating parties. The legitimate parties continuously monitor their physical commu-
nication parameters and encryption scheme. The detection of an eavesdropper compro-
mises the session’s communication. In the security analysis of key distribution schemes,
the eavesdropper is assumed to posses the following resources[10]:
• Unlimited computing power,
• Unlimited technology,
• Unlimited mathematical resources,
• Complete access to the communication channels.
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Any scheme that may be securely implemented after having taken the above into con-
sideration is theoretically secure and hence futureproof against any potential attack [6].
There are six main types of attacks that an eavesdropper may execute:
Ciphertext only
This is an attack in which the eavesdropper has a number of ciphertexts encrypted
in one encryption session. Using this information, the eavesdropper tries to deter-
mine the plaintext or encryption key.
Known plaintext
The eavesdropper has access to the ciphertext and the corresponding plaintext.
The eavesdropper requires the key or algorithm to decrypt future communications.
Chosen plaintext
The eavesdropper again has access to the ciphertext and the corresponding plain-
text, however the eavesdropper may choose plaintext to be encrypted. This may
be accomplished through an internal accomplice.
Direct key
This type of attack targets the key distribution process directly. The eavesdropper
attempts to retrieve the key without detection. This is the only type of attack
that is useful against the OTP encryption scheme.
Man-in-the-middle
The eavesdropper falsely identifies herself as the valid reciprocal party to both par-
ties. Eve conducts separate cryptographic communication between either party.
The eavesdropper thus has complete control of the information flow between the
parties. This type of attack can be prevented through authentication.
Denial of service
The adversary cuts all communication between the two parties disallowing any
form of communication. Neither the adversary or respective parties acquire any
information. This type of attack would be useful to obstruct an occurrence that
relies heavily on pre-communication. The adversary disallows information flow
but has no control or knowledge of the information content.
1.2.5 Classical Methods of Key Management
Any successful cryptosystem includes five basic steps [4]:
1. Alice and Bob must agree on a cryptosystem to be used.
2. They must distribute a key securely.
3. Alice should prepare the ciphertext for distribution.
4. Alice must transfer the ciphertext to Bob.
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5. Bob should decrypt the ciphertext to regain the plaintext.
An adversary has access to the 1st, 2nd and 4th stages of the cryptosystem. The security
of a good cryptosystem for public use should be independent of the secrecy of the
algorithm used. While access to the ciphertext permits a ciphertext only attack, some
algorithms are known to be secure against such attacks [4]. However, the key distribution
stage is critical to the security of the system. Each ciphertext is only as secure as the
key(s).
Key distribution and management thus forms an integral part of the security of the
cryptosystem. Historically key distribution was implemented manually through a secure
courier service or in person. However due to the information overflow and the digital
age new methods of key distribution are required that permit cryptography between
remote parties on-demand.
Two general key management techniques exist today, namely asymmetric and symmetric
key cryptography.
1.2.6 Asymmetric Key Cryptography
This technique may be illustrated as a postbox, anyone may place a message inside the
box, however, only those with the key are able to access the information. The key man-
agement systems, proposed by Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman in 1976 [11], uses
one-way functions to produce a set of keys. A one-way function permits easy computa-
tion of a result given the parameters, while the reverse is computationally taxing [12].
Computationally easy is construed as computable in a time polynomially dependent on
the length of the parameters while exponential growth in computing time is regarded
as computationally taxing or inefficient.
In asymmetric key cryptography a public and private key is produced through these
functions. Given the public key it is computationally intensive to retrieve the private
key, however the reverse is possible. This is not the case if sufficient additional informa-
tion is available as it would permit one to compute in the reverse direction efficiently.
This is known as a trapdoor. To date there are no known one-way functions without at
least one trapdoor [5]. This creates a potential vulnerability in the system.
A public key is made available to all those intending to communicate with a particular
party. The plaintext is encrypted using the public key. The ciphertext is then undeci-
pherable by any known efficient algorithm unless one has possession of the private key.
The Rivest, Shamir and Adleman (RSA) method is a common asymmetric encryption
method used at present [12].
The RSA algorithm is based on the prime factorization of large integers [12]. Given
two prime numbers it is easy to find the product, while computationally intensive to
find the prime factors of a given product. The complexity is further enhanced by larger
prime numbers and a greater amount of prime numbers used to generate the product.
However given additional information, such as one of the prime numbers, it becomes
relatively easy to reverse the process.
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Although solving the key distribution problem, public key cryptography is at most
computationally secure. It is known to be prone to chosen plaintext attacks. This is
especially the case when the plaintext forms a finite set of inputs [4]. Through trial
and error, an eavesdropper may match each ciphertext to its corresponding plaintext.
Further the eavesdropper is able to determine what the plaintext is not. This may be
valuable in some instances for example, when there are a finite number of input param-
eters.
Public key cryptography is generally slower than symmetric key cryptography. With
the continuous increase in data communication, speed is an essential parameter to note.
A greater disadvantage lies in the fact that there are no mathematical proofs for the
existence of one-way functions, hence we rely on the assumptions of complexity theory
[2] and that no efficient reverse algorithms for these functions have been found to date.
Advancements in mathematics may one day produce efficient algorithms for calculating
the reverse functions, this will make all such cryptosystems obsolete. Further Peter Shor
in 1994, developed an efficient quantum algorithm for such reverse functions [13] and
has been experimentally verified on small quantum processors [14]. This further raises
the question of a classical counterpart. With the development of quantum computers
fast becoming a reality [15], the socio-economic risks of asymmetric cryptosystems can-
not be undermined and hence further investigation into alternative key management
systems must be considered.
1.2.7 Symmetric Key Cryptography
In this encryption scheme an identical key is distributed between both parties. The
scheme may be considered like a safe. The sender locks the information in the safe, only
the recipient with an identical key may open the safe and have access to the information.
This type of encryption was the earliest type of encryption and has been developed over
the years. Ultimately the OTP scheme has been shown to provide provable security
while many other variations of symmetric key cryptography have been developed to
gain computational security [5].
In such a scheme, both parties distribute and agree on the secrecy of the key before any
secure communication is undertaken. A function is then used to combine the informa-
tion with the key to produce a ciphertext. The function is publicly known while the
symmetric key is transferred privately.
It is seen from the above that the entire secrecy of this type of cryptosystem lies is the
secrecy of the key [2]. Thus the problems arising within symmetric key cryptography
all lie in its key management structure. Firstly the key distribution is required to be
secure. This poses a problem in that not only is secure distribution technically challeng-
ing, it is also expensive. The storage and disposal of key bits must also be completed
in an appropriate fashion to facilitate the long term security of the information. Lastly
key throughput is expensive as communication between each set of individuals requires
separate and unique keys.
Due to the slow nature of asymmetric keys, public key cryptography is generally used
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to distribute a symmetric session key that is in turn expanded using recursive and non-
linear algorithms to produce a block key. This is used to encrypt the data. The AES
standard [11] is a symmetric cryptoscheme based on the above principle and is again at
most computationally secure.
Although the above schemes and standards temporarily solve the key management cri-
sis, we can not rely on these and potentially jeopardize our entire socio-economic system.
With the advent of quantum computers, classical key management will be inherently
flawed. Quantum key distribution will then be the only perfectly secure method of key
exchange.
1.3 Quantum Key Distribution
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is a means to symmetric key cryptography. The idea
of quantum based security was developed by S Wiesner in 1970 as a means of secure
money [16]. The concept used quantum principles, in particular the no-cloning theorem
to develop non-clonable money thus disallowing any fraudulent production of money.
This idea was then taken by CH Bennett and G Brassard in 1984 to developed the first
QKD protocol named the BB84 protocol [17]. The protocol was based on the polar-
ization of single photons. A stream of single photons were distributed between the two
parties that were in turn used to develop a symmetric key.
Bennett and Brassard also showed QKD to be theoretically secure [17]. The security of
this scheme is based on the fundamental laws of quantum physics rather than unproven
mathematical assumptions of complexity theory [2]. The scheme utilizes quantum me-
chanical two-level systems, known as qubits, to transfer a symmetric key between two
pre-authenticated parties for use in an encryption protocol.
It should be noted at the onset that QKD only provides a platform for secure key distri-
bution. However if this key is used, together with the OTP, one can achieve theoretically
secure communication [17]. In this thesis we assume the end-users’ stations are secure
from hackers etc. and the users are pre-authenticated. Procedures for authentication
and checks for data integrity and non-repudiation do presently exist.
Figure 1.3 illustrates the basic setup of a quantum cryptographic system.
Both Alice and Bob are connected to a quantum and classical channel. All authenti-
cation, post-distribution processes and encrypted communication is executed over the
classical channel while the raw key distribution process is conducted over a quantum
channel.
After authentication, Alice begins transmission of a randomly generated stream of qubits
to Bob over the quantum channel. Thereafter, the qubits undergo a post-distribution
process to form a secure key. If both parties accept the security level of the key, infor-
mation is encrypted via the OTP scheme and sent over the classical channel. Due to the
quantum nature of the particles used in the key distribution process, an eavesdropper
would cause discrepancies in the key and hence be detected. The eavesdropper will
have access to the ciphertext, but this will be useless as explained earlier. It should be









Eve  - Eavesdropper
Key ??
Encrypted text
Fig. 1.3: A diagram representing the roles of Alice, Bob and Eve in a quantum cryptographic
setup. Due the physical properties of the quantum information, Eve is unable to access
the key. As the information is encrypted in through the OTP scheme, the information
is provably secure.
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infiltration is detected in the key distribution phase.
Some implementations of QKD also use entanglement which refers to the sharing of
information between two spatially separated particles that had interacted at some pre-
vious time [10]. In the case of qubits implemented through photons, polarization or
a phase differential is used to create the two level quantum system [18]. The photon
implementations will be explained in further detail in the sections 1.3.4 and 2.5.
1.3.1 The Basis of Security in QKD
The security of this scheme is based on two fundamental laws of quantum mechanics
[10]:
• Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle: The measurement of one quantum ob-
servable intrinsically creates an uncertainty in other properties of the system.
• Principle of superposition: A qubit may be in a number of states simultane-
ously until observed at which point the superposition collapses down to a single
state.
Any attempt by Eve to extract information from the key will require a measurement.
Hence, due to the aforementioned, any observation will intrinsically alter the state of
the qubit. Thus the symmetrical nature of the key will change and the presence of an
eavesdropper will be detected by the legitimate users.
1.3.2 The Photon as a Qubit
The photon is a quantum of light and hence obeys the duality principle [19]. When
unobserved the photon acts as a wave and hence travels as a superposition. Upon
observation the photon collapses from a superposition to a particle.
The photon may be encoded as a qubit through a number of procedures. The two qubit
states may be represented as |0〉 and |1〉 where both are vectors in the Hilbert space [10].
This basis set is known as the computational basis [10]. Due to the quantum mechanical
nature of the photon, a superposition ϕ of the computational basis may also occur,
|ϕ〉 = α|0〉+ β|1〉, (1.7)
where |α|2 and |β|2 are the probabilities of the measuring states |0〉 and |1〉 respectively.
In particular we consider the consider the orthogonal set
|±〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 ± |1〉). (1.8)







Fig. 1.4: A schematic diagram of a quantum random number generator. Single photons are
emitted by the source, these photons then pass through a 50/50 beam-splitter (BS).
The photons are randomly routed between the two detectors with an overall probability
of 1/2 to each detector. Due to the quantum nature of the photon, the photon can
be spilt and routed to both detectors simultaneously but can only be measured at one
detector.
CH Bennett and G Brassard identified the polarization of the photon as an implemen-
tation of the qubit where the photons are polarized into one of two orthogonal states
[20]. A horizontally or vertically polarized photon is an example of a qubit with the
polarization axes forming the basis set. This basis set may be represented as | →〉 and
| ↑〉 respectively.
1.3.3 Quantum Random Number Generation
Random number generation is imperative to the success of a secure cryptosystem as
it is used to create the key bit sequence. Classical random number generators depend
on deterministic algorithms [13]. An initial number is randomly selected using current
environmental parameters. This number, known as the seed, is then fed into the number
generation algorithm to produce the next number in the sequence. Likewise all the
generated numbers are dependent on the previously generated sequence. This successive
routine produces a sequence of pseudo-random numbers. With sufficient computing
power or the partial knowledge of the algorithm used, one may reconstruct and predict
the upcoming numbers of the sequence. This creates a flaw in the cryptosystem as the
eavesdropper has access to the random numbers used in the key generation process.
Quantum Random Number Generators (QRNG) take advantage of the probabilistic
nature of quantum mechanics [21]. As the number sequence is dependent on a physical
outcome, it cannot be simulated by deterministic methods. The simplest setup for
such a generator is illustrated in Figure 1.4. This is an optical generator based on the
wave-particle duality of photons.
The setup consists of a single photon source, a beam splitter and two photon detectors,
D0 and D1. Detection at D0 or D1 represent a 0 or 1 respectively.
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A single photon source emits photons towards a 50/50 beam splitter. At the beam
splitter the photons is launched into a superposition and travels towards both detectors




where |0〉 is the state in which the photon travels towards D0 while |1〉 is when the
photon is routed to D1. The equal probability of both states is due to the 50/50
beam splitter. The detectors measure for the incoming photon simultaneously. Upon
measurement, the superposition collapses into its pure states with equal probability.
1.3.4 BB84 Protocol
The first QKD protocol, BB84, was designed by the physicists CH Bennett and G Bras-
sard in 1984 [17] while the first working prototype was developed by IBM at Yorktown
Height, New York in 1989 [20]. The BB84 protocol, although the first protocol devel-
oped, is still implemented today in commercial QKD systems [22, 23, 24] due to its
relatively simple setup and good efficiency. The protocol is described as follows:
Alice has access to a single qubit source, a quantum channel and a public classical chan-
nel. She may transmit a qubit in two non-orthogonal basis modes. Each mode has two
orthogonal states, viz. 0 and 1. This is summarized in Table 1.3.
Tab. 1.3: Alice may send four different qubit states. These comprise of two non-orthogonal
modes, each containing a pair of orthogonal states. The states are assigned binary
values such that each mode consists of the complete binary set.









One implementation of this is through the polarization of single photons [17] as shown in
Figure 1.5. The polarization states may be achieved by polarizing classical pulses before
attenuating them down to a single photon level [25]. The photons may be polarized
in two modes, the vertical-horizontal or the diagonal modes. We may represent the
vertical-horizontal mode as
| ↑〉 and | →〉,
while the diagonal modes may be represented as
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Fig. 1.5: Polarization states that may be sent by Alice in the BB84 protocol. Note that each
mode has two orthogonal states corresponding to the key bit values.
| ↗〉 = 1√
2
(| ↑〉+ | →〉)
and
| ↖〉 = 1√
2
(| ↑〉 − | →〉).
It is clear from the above that the modes consist of orthogonal states while the modes
themselves are non-orthogonal.
Alice emits a stream of qubits in random modes and states into the quantum channel
to Bob. Bob measures the incoming qubits in an independent random sequence of
basis modes. Thus there is a probability of 0.5 that Alice and Bob will send and
measure in a common basis. Polarization measurements are conducted through the use
a polarization dependent beam splitter. The beam splitter causes vertically polarized
photons to be routed to detector 0 while horizontally polarized photons to be sent to
detector 1. Diagonal mode measurements are first passed through a quarter-wave plate
before entering the beam spitter. If a common mode is used in sending and measuring
the qubit, a deterministic result will be obtained as shown in Figure 1.6. To illustrate
this, assume Alice transmitted a right diagonally polarized photon and Bob measured
in the diagonal mode.
At detector 0 we have: [ 1√
2
(〈↑ |+ 〈→ |)][ 1√
2
(| ↑〉+ | →〉)] = 1
At detector 1 we have: [ 1√
2
(〈↑ | − 〈→ |)][ 1√
2
(| ↑〉+ | →〉)] = 0
However, assuming differing modes of transmission and measurement, for example a
right diagonal photon measured in a vertical-horizontal mode, we have:
At detector 0: 〈↑ |[ 1√
2
(| ↑〉+ | →〉)] = 1√
2
.
At detector 1: 〈→ |[ 1√
2
(| ↑〉+ | →〉)] = 1√
2
.
We note that a probabilistic result with equal probability of detection at each detector.
Thus the qubit state remains unknown. This case is illustrated in Figure 1.7.
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Fig. 1.6: A photon sent and measured in a common basis by Alice and Bob will result in a
deterministic measurement. Bob will measure the exact polarization the photon was
sent in and thus a key bit may be produced from such a qubit.
Fig. 1.7: A photon sent and received in unmatched bases will produce a probabilistic result.
Bob will measure either a 0 or 1 randomly, thus a key bit can not be produced from
such a measurement.
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Fig. 1.8: Due to an eavesdropper’s interception of qubits during the distribution process, 25% of
the qubits measured in the correct basis by Bob contain errors. These qubits constitute
12.5% of the total qubits measured by Bob.
After the qubits have been transferred, Bob informs Alice, via a classical channel, of
his sequence of qubit measurement modes. Alice then informs Bob as to which qubits
were emitted and received using a common mode, only these qubits are used to form
the key, the remaining are discarded. This process is known as sifting. We note that in
all classical communications, no mention of the sent/measured qubits states is made.
An eavesdropper is unable to measure the value of the qubit without introducing uncer-
tainties. Due to the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, if Eve intercepts the transmission,
the qubit is necessarily destroyed or its properties altered. Consider, for simplicity, an
individual attack attack, Eve can only measure the qubit once while in its original state,
this is due to the fact that the qubit undergoes a wave function collapse upon measure-
ment. The original mode is unknown to Eve thus she is forced to guess the mode of
polarization. Due to Alice’s random choice of modes, Eve does not know the qubit state
with certainty and will hence introduce errors in the retransmission of qubits to Bob.
Alice and Bob may easily determine the presence of an eavesdropper by comparing small
quantities of their final key. The compared portion of the key is then discarded [22].
The presence of an eavesdropper is confirmed through a statistically significant number
of differences in the sifted key. In a noiseless environment, Eve would produce an error
of 25% within the sifted key as illustrated in Figure 1.8.
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1.3.5 Essential Parameters of QKD
Due to the different regime under which quantum cryptography operates, a special error
rate, known as the Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER), is used together with the raw key
rate to quantify usefulness of the implementation [25].
The Raw Key Rate (RKR) is the fraction of qubits that are successfully transmitted
between Alice and Bob compared to the total amount of qubits sent by Alice. This, in
practice, is less than 1. The equation for RKR is given by
Rraw = qµνηtηd, (1.10)
where q is the intrinsic efficiency of the implemented protocol (12 for BB84), ν is the
repetition frequency, µ is the average number of photons per pulse, ηt is the transmission
efficiency and ηd is the detector efficiency [25].
The amount of error present in the sifted key is called the Quantum Bit Error Rate
(QBER) [26]. If the QBER is statistically higher than anticipated, the presence of
an eavesdropper may be assumed as all errors are assumed to arrive from Eve. The
error in the key, and hence Eve’s knowledge of the key, may be reduced by use of
classical methods of error correction and privacy amplification. The The QBER may




= QBERopt + QBERdet + QBERacc. (1.11)
QBERopt is a measure of the optical quality and stability of the setup. Quantitavily it
is the probability of a photon to propagate to the wrong detector. It is independent of
the length of the transmission fibre [25].
The QBERdet comprises of three types of errors originating from detector inefficiencies.
It may be written as [26],
QBERdet = QBERdark + QBERafter + QBERstray. (1.12)
The QBERdark is a measure of the dark count while QBERafter represents the after-
pulsing of the detector. Both these error rates are dependent on the type of detectors
being used. QBERdark increases with the length of the transmission line and hence
effectively limits the range of QKD [25].
The QBERdark may be calculated as the ratio of probability of a dark count per gate,





QBERafter is the probability of each gate to measure an after-pulse. To reduce the effect
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of after pulses a dead time is introduced to the detector. During this time, immediately
after a detection, no gates are applied. However an increase in dead time decreases the
RKR. The optimum dead time varies as a function of distance [25].
Finally, QBERstray includes the errors caused by stray light within the medium [25].
The largest contribution to this in fibre is that of Rayleigh backscattering. The use of
wavelength division multiplexing may also increase this further.
QBERacc is an error that occurs in entanglement based QKD systems. It occurs due
to the fact that uncorrelated photons are produced by imperfect sources [18].
A good system requires not only a high Rraw as a high QBER will reduce the length of
the final key substantially. The fraction of bits lost in error correction, REC, routines





while the fraction lost to privacy amplification, RPA, is [25],
RPA = 1 + log2
(




The final useful key creation rate is given as [25],
Ruseful = Rraw(1−REC)(1−RPA). (1.16)
Privacy amplification is a classical procedure that removes information that Eve may
posses about the distributed key. It is noted that the higher the QBER implies a lower
the useful key rate due to the key length reduction in the privacy amplification process.
A higher QBER can thus also be interpreted as greater mutual information between
Alice and Eve, however a quantitative analysis of such information falls beyond the
scope of this thesis.
2. QUANTUM CHANNELS
2.1 Types of Quantum Channels
Together with quantum enabled devices on both Alice and Bob’s ends, QKD requires
a medium through which such quantum information may be transferred. A quantum
channel is a communication channel that can transmit quantum as well as classical
information. An example of quantum information is the state of a qubit while that of
classical information is the text of this document. Physically, the core difference between
the two types of channels is the fact that classical channels encode many information
carriers with the same bit of information while quantum channels permit the encoding
of exactly one quantum system for a particular bit of information.
Mathematically a channel is defined as a linear, completely positive, trace preserving
map [7]. This implies that:
• The channel maps positive operators to positive operators.
• The channel should preserve the normalization of states.
• The above results should apply when the channel maps the input to a sub-space
of a higher dimensional space.
Many realizations of quantum channels exist. They vary from natural media, as in
1D magnets used as spin-chain quantum channels [27] to line-of-sight link in free-space
through photon communication [28], to fabricated materials such as fibre optic cables.
Quantum channels, as in the classical case, are charactorised into various classes ac-
cording to the chactoristics of the transmission. There are 4 main characteristics of
quantum channels [7]:
Channels with memory
The output of a channel is dependent on the corresponding input as well as the
previous inputs to the channel.
Memoryless channels
The output of a channel is dependent solely on the corresponding input.
Noiseless channel
The channel is not effected by the environment, thus the output is independent
of any environmental parameters. This implies perfect communication.
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Noisy channel
The environment of the channel is non-trivial. Thus the output of the channel
depends on both the input and the environment.
Memoryless channels are of particular interest to Quantum Key Distribution. This is
due to the fact that any channel with memory would become a potential source of side
information to the eavesdropper, thus compromising the cryptosystem.
Noiseless channels are only a theoretical concept and are not physically implementable.
This is due to the intrinsic environmental background noise and defects within the
channel itself.
2.2 Shannon’s Coding Theorems
There are two fundamental questions with respect to communication channels. The
first is with regards to the amount of resources required to transmit information over a
channel. The second question is to the amount of tolerable noise over a channel.
C Shannon wrote two papers in 1948 [29, 9] in which he presented two theorems to
answer these questions. These two theorems formed the bases of information theory
and are presented below:
Noiseless channel coding theorem
This theorem provides a quantitative measure of the resources required to com-
municate information over a given channel. It implies that information can not
be compressed to a degree more than that corresponding to the total Shannon
entropy [29]. Compression exceeding the Shannon entropy will imply a loss of
information. This provides the upper bound to the capacity of any channel.
Noisy channel coding theorem
This theorem quantifies the tolerable noise that a channel may contain before
information distortion occurs. Shannon illustrated that in the presence of noise,
error correcting codes may be used to remove noise from the signal. He further
provided an upper bound to the amount of noise that may be removed through
error correcting codes.
Corresponding quantum theorems have been explored however only a counterpart to
Shannon’s Noiseless Channel Coding Theorem was developed by Ben Shumacher in
1995 [30].
2.3 Optical Fibre as a Quantum Channel
Every implementation of a quantum channel is non-ideal due to its physical nature,
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however optical fibre has been found to be one of the most practical quantum channels
available presently for photonic qubits. Single mode optical fibres act as a memoryless,
noisy quantum channels.
The use of fibre as a quantum channel was first considered after CH Bennett presented
a phase-encoded photonic implementation of the B92 protocol [31]. Thereafter many
QKD protocols were converted to their phase-encoded counterparts for implementation
over optical fibres, this includes the original BB84 protocol [31]. Together with this, the
fibre optic communication boom of the early 90’s saw much research and development
of low attenuation fibres and methods of dispersion reduction and compensation. Low
attenuation and dispersion rectification are essential as the maximum key distribution
distance and the detector gating windows, hence detector efficiency, are dependent on
them respectively. Modern fibre is characterized by a low attenuation in the order of
0.2dB/km. Decoherence effects due to polarization and dispersion effects are detailed
in sections 2.4.2 and 2.4.3.
Optical fibres further contain high bandwidths through multiplexing techniques permit-
ting high-speed concurrent communication between multiple parties, this will assist the
second generation QKD solutions to incorporate networking functionality.
The efficiency of an equivalent free-space system would depend on atmospheric condi-
tions such as humidity, mist and pressure gradients. Beam spreading and ambient light
also adversely effect the efficiency of a free-space implementation. However the use of
geostationary satellites would facilitate the creation of global QKD networks [32] not
achievable with present day optical fibre technology. Free-space channels further have
weak dispersion characteristics and almost no birefringence, both which are strongly
present in optical fibres.
Presently quantum channels are being developed as free-space satellite links [32], elec-
tron spins chains [27] and nuclear magnetic resonance [33].
Each type of quantum channel is suited for a particular terrian. To date two channels
have mainly been exploited for QKD deployment, line-of-sight free-space links and op-
tical fibres. Table 2.1 compares these two quantum channels highlighting their benefits
and drawbacks.
2.4 Fibre Characteristics
2.4.1 The Propagation of Light in Optical Fibres
The propagation of light through an optical fibre is due to a combination of total
internal reflection and waveguide refraction. A varying refractive index profile creates
a waveguide within the fibre. The center of the fibre, known as the core, consists of
an impurity doped region that has a higher refractive index as compared to the outer
cladding. This causes total internal reflection or refraction, depending on the profile
of the fibre, thus confining the light pulse within the core. The size of the core varies
between the different types of fibre.
Two common types of fibres occur. Multimode fibre has a core diameter in the order
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Tab. 2.1: A comparison between two of the most widely used quantum channels for QKD. Each
channel is suited for particular usage and as such a global quantum network would
require the integration of all such channels to optimize the throughput of the network.
Free-Space QKD Fibre based QKD
Implements a ‘line-of-sight’ Implemented over any
setup all-optical fibre link
Weather dependent Laid fibres weather independent
QKD implemented to a distance QKD implemented to a distance
of 144km [34] of more than 120km [35]
Possibility of the development Ideal for MANs or long haul
of global QKD networks intercity connections
through satellites
Cheap efficient detector Expensive inefficient detector
technology technology
Greater susceptibility to Waveguide restricts beam
beam spreading implying greater spreading thus energy confined
transmission loss to the core
Greater erroneous detections Fibre protected from external
light sources
Practically non-birefringent Birefringence causes substantial
difficulties
Weakly dispersive Highly dispersive
Linkage dependant on terrain Linkage dependant on
fibre infrastructure
No commercial QKD systems 3 commercial suppliers
available
of 50µm while single mode fibre has a diameter of between 6-10µm. Due to dispersive
effects, only single mode fibre is suitable for QKD [18].
Optical fibre has a typical absorption spectrum with three transmission bands. The
unique absorption characteristic is due to a superposition of Rayleigh backscattering,
infrared absorbtion and certain molecule excitations [36]. The transmission bands are
troughs within the absorption spectrum of the fibre. As may be seen in Figure 2.1 the
third window at around 1550nm produces the least attenuation and is hence best suited
for telecommunication and QKD.
Apart from the attenuation, another factor restricting QKD is the coupling of the pho-
tons to the environment. Such coupling causes decoherence and may provide an eaves-
dropper with sufficient side information to tap the system unnoticed. In this case the
environment is regarded as everything beyond the degrees of freedom of the used to
encode the photon [18]. Thus if the photon is encoded through phase, the polarization
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Fig. 2.1: The absorbtion spectrum of optical fibre. Attenuation at smaller wavelengths is due
to phonon absorbtion while larger wavelengths are absorbed through infrared absorb-
tion. This coupled with Rayleigh back scattering and O-H absorbtion producing three
attenuation minima known as the transmission bands. Adapted from [1].
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and wavelength of the photon act as part of the environment. This is significant as if
the encoding or measuring instruments have a dependence on any other property of the
photon, it would serve as side information to an eavesdropper.
In the following sections we discuss decoherence through polarization and dispersion
based effects in fibre.
2.4.2 Polarization Effects
The polarization affected propagation through optical fibres causes many technical chal-
lenges towards the implementation of QKD systems. Such effects are inherently a prob-
lem for polarization encoded QKD systems, however as the interference visibility is also
dependent on the relative polarization of the photons, these effects create complications
within phase encoded systems as well. Three major polarization related affects occur
as explained below:
Birefringence
Optical fibre consists of two orthogonal transmission axes, the fast and slow axes.
All light traveling within the fibre is polarized into these axes. Light traveling in
the fast axis travels at a higher group velocity and hence decoupling between the
polarization states occur inducing dispersion. The birefringence is caused due to
imperfections and stresses within the fibre. Such effects are relatively stable for
slow variations in temperature and motion [18].
Geometric phase
This is a quantum mechanical effect based on the Pancharatnam-Berry phase.
It is a phase shift that is acquired by a quantum state due to a cyclic adiabatic
process. The phenomena was discovered in 1956 [37]. The effects of the geometric
phase can easily be overcome through periodic calibration of the apparatus and
quantum channel. This however may be impractical if the fibre variations occur
rapidly as in the case of ariel fibre cables.
Polarization dependent losses
These losses are mainly due to optical components that have polarization de-
pendent effects. Essentially these components act as polarizers blocking off a
particular polarization of light [36]. This is a stable effect within the component,
however the output intensity of light may be unstable due to the coupling between
the component and the input signal that will vary due to the varying birefringence
of the fibre.
2.4.3 Dispersive Effects
Dispersion reduces the signal quality through power fading and inter-symbol interfer-
ence. The former is of greater concern to present QKD solutions as power fading causes
a higher temporal variance of the arriving pulse, hence a wider time bin or gating time
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is required for the detector. This, as seen earlier, severely degrades the efficiency of the
detectors and increases the QBER. Three types of dispersive effects occur:
Modal dispersion
The higher refractive index of the core may be regarded as a potential well. If this
well is large, corresponding to multi-mode fibre, then many bounded or guided
states may occur [38]. The varying guided modes are produced due to the wave-
length dependent refraction of light in the waveguide as well as the acceptance
angle of the light into the fibre. As each transmitted pulse consists of multiple
modes of light a two fold effect is noticed. Firstly each mode has a high probability
of coupling with other modes resulting in the decoherence of the photons. Sec-
ondly as the modes travel varying lengths through the fibre, they cause a widening
of the received pulse implying a larger window time for detection. This type of
dispersion has been largely rectified through the use of single mode fibres. Due to
the small core diameter, this type of fibre allows only one mode of propagation.
Hence only single mode fibre is suitable for QKD [18].
Chromatic mode dispersion
This type of dispersion is of major concern in phase-encode QKD systems as such
systems rely on the localization of the photon in space. Varying group velocities
within the different arms an interferometer would cause a drop in visibility. Chro-
matic mode dispersion is caused due to the dependance of the optical density on
the frequency of light [38]. Thus different wavelengths of light travel at varying
speeds within the fibre and arrive at the detector with a temporal variance greater
than that of the original pulse. As this type of dispersion is a stable effect in that
it is a static property of the fibre. The use of Distributed Feedback (DFB) lasers
and dispersion shifted fibre may be used to overcome such dispersive properties.
DFB lasers emit very narrow bandwidth pulses hence reducing the optical density
spread seen by the pulse.
Polarization mode dispersion
This is a birefringence related phenomena. Optical fibre may be viewed as a chain
of randomly orientated birefringent segments. These segments are created through
stresses and defects within the fibre. The orientation of the transmission axes vary
for each of these sections. For a particular segment the birefringence ranges in the
order of a few ps per km [38]. The smaller the dispersion between the polarization
modes in each segment, the better the polarization mode coupling hence a smaller
dispersion effect at the point of defect. The random coupling of the polarization
modes may be seen as a random walk and hence the Polarization Mode Dispersion
(PMD) is measured in ps per km1/2.
PMD has limited effects on phase encoded QKD as the use of a laser with coherence
time greater than the largest birefringent section in fibre would readily compensate
for this dispersion [18]. Active compensation techniques would be required for
the implementation of polarization encoded QKD over optical fibre or photons
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produced through parametric down conversion Ḣowever other birefringence related
technicalities do pose many complex challenges in the implementation of phase
encoded QKD systems.
Due to the quantum based requirements of a single photon stream many of the compen-
sation and regeneration techniques used in classical communication can not be used in
QKD. Electro-optical components convert the optical signals to electrical before acting
on the signal, this however constitutes a measurement and hence destroys the quantum
coherence and superposition of the qubit.
Classical all-optical regeneration techniques rely on the stimulated emission [36]. This
process produces relatively high amounts of spontaneous emission. As the probability
of stimulation is proportional to the signal power, a single photon would have a negli-
gible stimulation probability. Further this type of regeneration would conflict with the
no-cloning theorem.
2.5 Polarization to Phase Encoding
Polarization encoded QKD faces many technological challenges if implemented through
optical fibre as noted above. This is mainly due to the presence of transmission axes
and the birefringence caused by them. Thus the polarization state undergoes a random
walk over the surface of the Poincaré sphere. Such implementations would, in the
least, require a complex active compensation system for polarization recovery at Bob’s
end with a frequent calibration process. The recent developments in all-optical PMD
compensation methods for high speed classical communication have however rekindled
the interest in fibre based polarization encoded QKD [39].
A convenient fibre-based encoding method was discovered by CH Bennett in 1992 [31].
This uses the relative phase between two photon pulses. The polarization encoding
may be directly interpreted into phase encoding through the use of a Mach-Zehnder
interferometer as shown in Figure 2.2.
A photon is placed into a superposition through the use of a 2x2 coupler. This serves
as a fibre based counterpart to a beam splitter. The two pulses of the photon travel
through each arm on which a phase shift is added by Alice and Bob respectively. These
combine at the exit point of the interferometer through a coupler that serves, together
with the detectors, as the measurement apparatus. The relative phase of the pulses
span out the azimuthal angle while the bias in the first coupler adjusts the latitude.
Thus any state on the Poincaré sphere may be created by the adjustment of the applied
phase and coupler bias.
The orthogonal states measured by a polarization dependent beam splitter is interpreted
through the interference of the two pulses upon exit from the interferometer. Construc-
tive or destructive interference leads to the routing of the photons to either detector
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Laser
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D0
D1
Fig. 2.2: A schematic diagram of a Mach-Zehnder interferometer. The pulse is split at the first
coupler and travels through both arms of the interferometer. In each arm a phase
differential is added. As the lengths of the arms are identical, the pulses reach the
second coupler at the same point in time. Upon recombining interference occurs and
the photon is routed to the detectors.
deterministically.
The classical Mach-Zehnder interferometric setup however is impractical to setup in
practice. Such a setup would require two fibre based quantum channels, furthermore
these fibres are to be equal in length and stable to within a few wavelengths of the pho-
tons to ensure good interference visibility. To curb such complications the pulses are sent
through a single fibre using a time modulated method. This may be achieved through
the use of two asymmetric interferometers, one on each side of a single communication
channel separating Alice and Bob. The each arm of the Mach-Zehnder interferometer
consists of the common channel, the long arm of one asymmetric interferometer and the
short arm of the other. This creates a spatial shift between the two arms of the Mach-
Zhender interferometer permitting the pulses to travel in separate time bins within the
common quantum channel.
As the lengths of the two arms differ, the pulse emitted by Alice is sent through the
quantum channel in two time bins. Upon arrival at Bob’s end, the time separated
pulses enter a second identical asymmetric interferometer. If the pulses travel through
the complementary arms, both will have traveled equal distances. Thus interference
will occur at the second coupler [40]. Such a system can be further enhanced by using
a ‘Plug & Play ’ passive auto-compensating system [41] or classical pulse calibration
methods [23].
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Fig. 2.3: A Schematic diagram of the phase-encoded BB84 protocol setup. Alice may choose 1
of 4 phase shifts corresponding to her mode and state choice while Bob has 2 choices
of measurement modes. The nett phase between the pulses routes the photon to a
particular detector.
The BB84 protocol may also be implemented using a phase-encoded qubits as illustrated
in Figure 2.3.
A photon is emitted by Alice’s station; this photon enters a superposition of two time
shifted pulses at an asymmetric interferometer. A phase differential is also added to
one of the pulses within the interferometer. The phase choice determines the mode and
state of Alice’s qubit as described in Table 2.2.
Tab. 2.2: Alice may send four different qubit states interpreted as phases. Note again that she






After traveling over the transmission line, the receiver routes the pulses through converse
arms of a second identical interferometer such that both pulses will have traveled equal
distances upon exiting. Within the interferometer, a phase phase shift of 0 or π/2 is
added to the second pulse corresponding to the mode selection process by Bob. Upon
exiting the interferometer, the two pulses of the photon recombine and the photon
undergoes constructive or destructive interference due to the nett phase differential
added by Alice and Bob [42]. The interference, corresponding to the binary set, is
measured through the use of two single photon detectors and used to create the raw
key. Table 2.3 demonstrates the permutations that photons may be sent and received
in and the corresponding key bit value produced.
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Tab. 2.3: Eight emission/measurement permutations occur. For each state sent by Alice, Bob
may measure the qubit in the correct or incorrect basis thus giving rise to deterministic
or probabilistic results respectively. The ‘?’ below in the table represent probabilistic
result from which no key bit can be produced in the BB84 protocol.
Alice Bob Raw Key
Mode State Phase Mode Phase Phase Differential Key Bit
1 0 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 2 π/2 π/2 ?
1 1 π 1 0 π 1
1 1 π 2 π/2 π/2 ?
2 0 π/2 1 0 π/2 ?
2 0 π/2 2 π/2 0 0
2 1 3π/2 1 0 3π/2 ?
2 1 3π/2 2 π/2 π 1
As a key bit may only be created when the photon is sent and measured in a com-
mon mode, half of the sent qubits are wasted thus reducing the efficiency of the BB84
protocol.
32 2. Quantum Channels
3. QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION IN PRACTICE
In this section we introduce a practical QKD system through which our initial tests
on quantum networks will be performed. We further explain a practical method of
increasing the efficiency of QKD protocols through post-processing means.
3.1 id3000 Clavis QKD System
3.1.1 Principle of operation
The id3000 Clavis Quantum Key Distribution System has been developed by id Quan-
tique, Switzerland. This QKD system implements a phase-encoded BB84 ‘Plug & Play ’
scheme, proposed by H Zbinden et al from the University of Geneva [40].
The setup described in section 2.5 requires identical interferometers for good interference
visibility and hence low error rates. The coupling ratios and lengths of the corresponding
arms of the two interferometers should be equal. Furthermore, phase modulators (PM)
are generally polarization dependent; hence polarization rectification must be observed
during the transmission. Due to the above, the interferometers need to be frequently
aligned and the internal path lengths kept stable to an order of tens of nanometres [43].
The ‘Plug & Play’ system is based on the above. However it integrates a time-multiplexed
auto-compensating procedure using Faraday mirrors [40]. The advantage of such an im-
plementation is that it is stable and polarization independent. Figure 3.1 highlights the
differences of the clavis system from the conventional setup.
The system consists of a single interferometer in Bob’s apparatus (QS-B). Due to the
fact that fluctuation time of the fibre birefringence is longer than the time of flight of
the photon, passive compensation of polarization dependent effects are observed [40].
Thus any modifications in the polarization of the photon are compensated on the return
trip.
A classical light pulse of high intensity is emitted by QS-B. The pulse is then split
through an asymmetric interferometer. The first pulse, P1, moves directly to Alice’s
station (QS-A) through the short arm of the interferometer, while the second pulse, P2,
undergoes a polarization rotation in the long arm. The classical pulses then propagate
towards QS-A as shown in Figure 3.2(a). After reflection QS-A attenuates the pulses
to single photon levels. Alice’s phase shift is also incorporated into P2 with the use of
the phase modulator in QS-A. This is illustrated in Figure 3.2(b). Due to the Faraday
Mirror, the reflected pulses are in orthogonal polarizations with respect to the incident
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Laser
Bob: QS-B Alice: QS-A
Fig. 3.1: A schematic diagram illustrating the setup for the phase encoded auto-compensating
BB84 protocol. This setup is characterized by the use of a single interferometer and
a Faraday Mirror (FM). A variable attenuator (VA) reduces the classical pulses to

















Fig. 3.2: This figure illustrates when phase shifts are added to the pulses in the Plug & Play
QKD scheme. Figure 3.2(a) depicts the classical pulses being sent to Alice with no
encoded information. In figure 3.2(b) the pulses are attenuated to single photon level,
polarization switched to orthogonal state and a phase shift added to P2. While in
the interferometer in the return trip, a phase shift is added to P1 in the long arm as
depicted in figure 3.2(c).
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beam thus on the return trip, P2 propagates through the short arm and P1 through
the long arm, hence both pulses travel equal distances. A phase shift is added to
P1 corresponding to the measurement choice of Bob, as in Figure 3.2(c). The pulses
interfere upon exiting the interferometer as in the original setup.
3.1.2 A Comparison of the Randomness of Numbers Generated through Classical and
Quantum Methods
The Clavis system was tested over a dedicated 13km of optical fibre in a laboratory
environment. A secure key of 50 Mbits was created and distributed between the two
stations. Data was encrypted and transferred at over an ethernet cable.
During the key distribution the avalanche photo-diodes are set to a temperature of -
50OC and a dark count probability of 6.41705x10-6 and 1.00671x10-5 was measured on
the two detectors respectively. The maximum interference visibility on each detector
was 3.6% and 4.7% respectively. All the above parameters were measured on the Clavis
system through software provided with the system.
A total of 52,248,000 qubits were sent while the detectors were gated 11,726,727 times.
Thus only 22.4% of the pulses produced were measured due to the dead time of the
detectors after a photon measurement. During the distribution 7.29% of detector gates
resulted in detections of which 0.06% were double detections and 3.62% were valid
measurements (send and received in a common basis). The overall QBER was measured
at 0.93%.
Figure 3.3 represents the detector counts for the two detectors according to the phase
selection permutations of Alice and Bob given in Table 3.1.
Tab. 3.1: Phase selection permutations in the BB84 Protocol.
Mode Selection Phase Added by Alice Phase Added by Bob
1 0 Mode 1 0 Mode 1
2 π Mode 1 0 Mode 1
3 0 Mode 1 π/2 Mode 2
4 π Mode 1 π/2 Mode 2
5 π/2 Mode 2 0 Mode 1
6 3π/2 Mode 2 0 Mode 1
7 π/2 Mode 2 π/2 Mode 2
8 3π/2 Mode 2 π/2 Mode 2
A further key stream of 5 million bits was generated through the QKD system and
analysed with the acclaimed ‘diehard’ tests [8]. In such tests, the randomness of the
input is assigned a value between 0.000 and 1.000 indicating the independence of the key
stream. A uniform distribution of P-values indicates good independence of the input

















Fig. 3.3: A graph illustrating the detector count summary as per the phase selection permu-
tations given in Table 3.1. It is seen that common mode measurements result in
deterministic results. Detector 2 received a greater number of photon detections in the
uncorrelated measurements due to a higher interference visibility.
stream. A summary of the results are given in Table 3.2.
It may be calculated that the quantum random number generation process produces a
smaller standard deviation amongst the p-values for the 14 tests. As a uniform set of
p-values indicate good independence [44], it is noted that the quantum random numbers
are better suited for OTP applications.
3.2 An Alternate QKD Protocol for a BB84 Cryptosystem Apparatus
Cryptosystems implementing the BB84 cryptosystem, may be used to implement other
protocols such as the SARG [18] and Singapore protocols. Such protocols have various
benefits as compared to the BB84 protocol.
The BB84 protocol distributes the raw key through the transfer of qubits in two non-
orthogonal basis modes. The distribution and measurement modes are chosen inde-
pendently and randomly by Alice and Bob while transmitting and receiving the qubits
respectively. Thus, as mentioned earlier, the BB84 protocol, although simple to imple-
ment, has an intrinsic loss of 50%. The number of key bits created per qubit distributed,
or the sifting efficiency, is 1/2.
Further the above protocol verifies the security of the key with a post-sifting process to
ensure the correctness of a key sample through two-way communication over a public
channel. A statistical analysis is then performed on the results to confirm key’s secrecy.
The key segment used for this process must then be discarded reducing the key length
further.
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Tab. 3.2: Test results from the diehard random number tests indicate the a greater uniformity
of p-values, hence randomness, of the quantum generated key stream when compared
to classically generated random numbers.
P-Value
Random Test Classical Random Quantum
Numbers Random Key
Birthday Spacings Test 0.8942 0.2309
Overlapping 5-Permutations Test 0.7897 0.5307
Binary Rank Test (31x31 matrixes) 0.3956 0.3201
Binary Rank Test (32x32 matrixes) 0.4051 0.4197
Binary Rank Test (6x8 matrixes) 0.7907 0.3179
Bitstream Test 0.3567 0.0772
Count the 1s Test 0.3026 0.5114
The Parking Lot Test 0.1898 0.4022
Minimum Test 0.2172 0.3625
3D Spheres Test 0.6625 0.6422
Squeeze Test 0.4966 0.2204
Overlapping Sums Test 0.4387 0.3562
Craps Test (Wins) 0.7984 0.0966
Craps Test (Throws) 0.6181 0.6063
Integrating the tomographic analysis of the Singapore protocol [45] into the BB84 setup
can enhance the overall efficiency of the system. The enhanced protocol uses the original
physical BB84 setup, however the Iterative Key Exchange (IKE) algorithm [46] is used
to process the unmatched qubits of the BB84 protocol. All the experimental verification
was conducted on the id3000 Clavis QKD system explained earlier.
3.2.1 Singapore Protocol
The Singapore protocol is a method of QKD devised by BG Englert et.al. in 2003. It
is known to have a better noise tolerance than the BB84 protocol [45]. This protocol
has the potential of achieving a theoretical efficiency of 41.4% for key bits produced per
qubit. The minimal qubit tomography used in the Singapore protocol minimizes the the
number of redundant parameters measured in the more general six-state tomographic
protocols. The Singapore protocol is characterized by [46, 45]:
1. Minimal Qubit Tomography (MQT) for acquisition of raw data.
2. State tomography for security verification.
3. Key generation through an iterative method.
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Fig. 3.4: The Poincaré sphere representing the four basis states used in the Singapore protocol.
The four states maybe alternatively constructed by taking four vectors from the center
of a cube to its non-adjacent corners.
In the Singapore protocol four basis states are used to span the Poincaré sphere and
hence characterize all other states. This reduces the redundant tomography in the
original six state tomographic protocols. The four state protocol also allows for a higher
mutual information as compared to the six state protocol. Details of the implementation
may be found in [45]. When seen on the Poincaré sphere, the four basis states, as shown
in Figure 3.4, are formed by vectors from the center to non-adjacent corners of a cube
resulting in a tetrahedral. These basis vectors will completely characterize any other
arbitrary state in the Poincaré sphere.
In essence, the security verification of the Singapore protocol is based on detection
statistics. The method of key generation relies on the fact that each phase selection
by Alice ensures that Bob has a null detection probability on a unique detector. The
remaining three detectors in each case posses equal detections probabilities according
to Table 3.3 [46].
Tab. 3.3: The detection probabilities for each detector in the Singapore protocol as per the phase
selection of Alice. Each phase selection of Alice disallows a click on unique detector,
while the detection probabilities on the remaining detectors are equal.
Alice Probabilities of Detector Clicks
Phase Options A B C D
A 0 0.083 0.083 0.083
B 0.083 0 0.083 0.083
C 0.083 0.083 0 0.083
D 0.083 0.083 0.083 0
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The security verification is confirmed through the correct detection statistics measured
by Bob [45]. A recursive algorithm, called the Iterative Key Exchange (IKE), is utilized
to form a secret key from the raw qubit exchange. Each of Alice’s phase options with
its corresponding detector of null detection probability are preassigned a value from
A-D. After the qubits have been exchanged, the key bits are produced in the following
manner:
1. Bob chooses two position in his sequence that contain a common letter. These
positions are communicated to Alice over a classical channel.
2. Alice checks her sequence at the respective positions. She may either have identical
or differing letters at these positions.
3. If Alice has different letters, she groups the two letters together and creates another
set from the two remaining letters. She knows that Bob received a detection on a
detector from the latter group.
(a) Alice then randomly assigns bit values to both the sets and relays this back
to Bob over a public line. She records the value of the latter set as her key
bit.
(b) On receiving the sets and the corresponding values, Bob records the the value
of the set that contains the detector on which he measured a detection.
4. If Alice finds a common letter at the positions Bob conveyed she informs Bob.
Both then store their respective letters in a secondary sequence. The secondary
sequence contains the same statistical distribution as the original sequence [45].
5. After the primary sequence has been exhausted, the above procedure is repeated
with the secondary sequence.
The above iterative method can continue indefinitely, however it is only practical to
perform the cycle 3-5 times as thereafter the efficiency is not substantially increased.
This is due to the exponential growth of the number of distributed qubits required to
create a key bit in successive cycles [45].
3.2.2 IKE implemented on the BB84 Setup
The physical setup for the enhanced BB84 protocol is identical to the original phase
encode BB84 protocol [31] illustrated in Figure 3.5.
The post-distribution analysis, the IKE, requires an alternate interpretation of the ap-
paratus setup. In this technique, the two phase modulations in the receiver’s interfer-
ometer double each physical detector as two detecting devices. Thus the setup is viewed
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Fig. 3.5: Schematic diagram of the phase encoded enhanced BB84 protocol setup. A laser creates
pulses of low intensity light as photonic qubits. These qubits are phase encoded through
a set of identical asymmetric interferometers. The physical setup of this protocol is
identical to the normal BB84 protocol setup except that each detector is doubled as
two virtual detectors depending on the phase shift of Bob’s interferometer.
as having 4 virtual detectors. However, only two of these ‘detectors’ may be evaluated
during a given measurement. A random phase shift at the interferometer simulates the
random path taken by the photon in the original setup.
Each phase shift of Alice creates a null detection probability on a unique virtual detec-
tor. For example a phase shift of π added to the qubit by Alice, Bob may either select
a phase shift of 0 or π/2. With a 0 phase shift detectors A and B are measured while
detectors C and D are measured with a phase selection of π/2. A net phase shift of
π would result from a 0 phase shift thus causing destructive interference and hence a
deterministic result is produced. Thus, for the aforementioned example, detector B will
always click. However a phase selection of π/2 will result in a probabilistic measurement
with each detector clicking 50% of the time.
If the phase shifts are chosen randomly, the resultant detection probability will be as in
Table 3.4.
Tab. 3.4: The detection probabilities of the proposed enhanced BB84 protocol has the same core
property permitting the IKE process. Each phase selection by Alice induces a zero
detection probability on a unique detector. The remaining detectors have a symmetric
detection probability although to equal.
Alice Probabilities of Detector Clicks
Phase Options A B C D
0 0 0.125 0.063 0.063
π 0.125 0 0.083 0.063
π/2 0.063 0.063 0 0.125
3π/2 0.063 0.063 0.125 0
The key creation process consists on a number of cycles. The first cycle implements the
standard BB84 approach [17], thus creating a key with a sifting efficiency of 50%. The
remaining qubits, with an unmatched basis, are used in the following recurring cycles.
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The key developed through the IKE process, creates a key with 40% sifting efficiency.
There is one scenario in which a possible security breach may occur during the additional
IKE cycles. This will occur when both the letters of Alice’s selection consists of detectors
from one mode of measurement. The security breach is caused as the measured bases
will have been broadcast in the previous BB84 sifting cycle. Thus an eavesdropper may
infer the key bit through the knowledge of the measured basis. In this situation the
sender calls for the abandonment of the particular qubits in question.
The IKE process can be implemented on the without the the first cycle of BB84 sifting.
In this case, the sifted key will be produced with 40% efficiency however it will be more
noise resistant. This is due to the fact that the IKE process is less susceptible to noise
than BB84 sifting [45].
3.2.3 Experimental Verification
Experimental verification of this setup was realized on the id3000 Clavis QKD System.
10 sets of 100 Mbits each were distributed between the stations using a ‘Plug & Play’
BB84 setup. The detection probability was then calculated. Due to the asymmetric
interference visibility of the detectors, the theoretical detection probabilities were recal-
culated and shown in Table 3.5. It is noted that the visibility did not effect the zero
detection probability induced by Alice’s phase choices.
Tab. 3.5: Due to technical reasons, the physical detectors have an asymmetric detection visibil-
ity. The theoretical detection probabilities of Bob, induced by Alice’s phase choices, is
thus modified and presented here. It is noted that probabilities still posses the unique
property required for IKE.
Alice’s Probabilities of Detector Clicks
Phase A B C D
0 0 0.160± 8.00× 10−3 0.045± 2.25× 10−3 0.080± 4.00× 10−3
π 0.090± 4.50× 10−3 0 0.045± 2.25× 10−3 0.080± 4.00× 10−3
π/2 0.045± 2.25× 10−3 0.080± 4.00× 10−3 0 0.160± 8× 10−3
3π/2 0.045± 2.25× 10−3 0.080± 4.00× 10−3 0.090± 4.50× 10−3 0
Each key of 100 Mbits was distributed and analyzed independently. The average result
was then calculated and is presented in Table 3.6.
The measured detection probabilities maintained the properties of the theoretical model.
In particular, the disallowed states, required for the IKE process in the enhanced BB84
protocol, were maintained. Less than 1% of all detections were measured in the disal-
lowed states. These errors may be due to noise on the line or detector inefficiencies such
as dark counts. These errors are sifted out during the IKE process and form part of the
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Tab. 3.6: The experimental detection probabilities of the photon detectors correspond closely to
the predicted values. In particular the disallowed states, essential for the IKE process
in the enhance BB84 protocol, are maintained.
Alice’s Probabilities of Detector Clicks
Phase A B C D
0 0.001± 1.85× 10−5 0.159± 2.93× 10−3 0.045± 8.30× 10−4 0.081± 1.49× 10−3
π 0.092± 1.69× 10−3 0.002± 3.69× 10−5 0.041± 7.56× 10−4 0.081± 1.49× 10−3
π/2 0.046± 8.49× 10−4 0.073± 1.34× 10−3 0.001± 1.85× 10−5 0.159± 2.93× 10−3
3π/2 0.041± 7.56× 10−4 0.085± 1.57× 10−3 0.085± 1.57× 10−3 0.002± 3.69× 10−5
QBER.
A further 50 Mbits were distributed and the efficiency of the standard and enhanced
BB84 protocol compared. The results are shown in Table 3.7.
Tab. 3.7: An analysis of the key sifting cycles in the enhanced BB84 protocol shows that an
increase of almost 40% in the efficiency is achieved through five cycles of the IKE as
compared to the original BB84 protocol.
Cycle Method Total Key Size Efficiency QBER
1 Standard BB84 413,039 0.508 0.039± 7.22× 10−4
1 IKE 511,233 0.628 0.032± 5.81× 10−4
2 IKE 535,610 0.658 0.030± 5.56× 10−4
3 IKE 541,540 0.665 0.029± 5.48× 10−4
4 IKE 542,942 0.667 0.029± 5.48× 10−4
5 IKE 543,195 0.668 0.029± 5.48× 10−4
It is seen from Table 3.7 that the resultant key size, and hence the sifting efficiency,
has increased by 31.51% from the standard BB84 protocol. It is also noted that the
IKE algorithm tends to its asymptotic limit after 5 cycles thus further cycles will not
be worth the computational time required.
4. QUANTUM NETWORKS
To date, QKD has been characterized by a dedicated two-point connection between end-
users. This has served as a bottleneck towards the maturity of this research field into a
commercially viable end product. Presently there are 3 companies globally producing
such cryptographic devices1.
A two-node QKD setup has restricted applicative use due to the following reasons:
1. QKD is intrinsically limited in spatial coverage. This is mainly due to the absorp-
tion and dispersion of the qubit within the quantum channel as explained earlier.
The dark counts increase the QBER and hence effectively limit the distance a key
may be distributed securely.
2. The quantum key distribution rate is lower than its classical counterpart. Com-
mercially viable products would require data rates comparable to present today
cryptography. This again may be shown to be related to the detector inefficiency
and need for a dead time between detections. Free space QKD does however
permit faster key distribution rates due to the silicon detectors used.
3. The QBER exceeds the classical error rate by an order of 105. This is exceptionally
high, however this can be measured as a trade-off for the enhanced security.
4. The two-point QKD setup is prone to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks that isolate
the end users. Hence a two-point setup would be considered frail. In order for a
robust system, redundant light paths should be available to prevent such attacks.
5. The resources required for QKD far exceeds the product output. Hence the over-
head capita is vastly increased when compared to classical cryptography.
6. Due to the dedicated fibre links between parties, mapping of key distribution
relations is easily accessible. This may act as possible side information, thus
compromising the provable security of the system.
The limitations may be viewed as a trade-off between the security and capita cost of
the key. Commercial quantum cryptographic systems are available at present, however
many have integrated classical cryptographic schemes to offer enhanced security rather
than provable security [47].
To counter the above bottlenecks, much research has been performed in the field of
1 id Quantique, MagiQ and SmartQuantum
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Quantum Networks (QN) in order to facilitate multi-user QKD on-demand with good
Quality of Service (QoS).
A QN is a network that utilizes quantum mechanical principles to implement provably
secure key transfer in a multi-node system. Such networks permit a hybrid of quantum
channels to be integrated to form a complete network. This is essential for the opti-
mization network throughput as some quantum channels are better suited to particular
terrains. There is greater robustness against DoS attacks due to redundant lightpaths
within a network. This also assists in the reduction of key relation knowledge by any
adversary.
Many investigations have been conducted and are currently being executed in an at-
tempt to resolve the present limitations of QKD [48, 49]. Spatially separated entan-
glement of photons and quantum percolation theory [50] are two such examples. The
integration of QKD systems into existing network architecture is of particular interest
for developing commercially viable solutions.
The implementation of multi-user QKD over a fibre domain was spurred by the intro-
duction of second-generation all-optical fibre networks. Previously fibre networks were
opto-electrical, thus while the links between networking components and nodes were in
the optical domain, the networking components converted optical signals to electrical
pulses in order to manipulate or route the signal. The pulses are then converted back
into the optical domain. These types of networks are unsuitable for QKD as the photons
would be destroyed upon measurement by the components. All-optical, or second gen-
eration, networks use the properties of the light-pulses, eg the wavelength or intensity,
to manipulate the pulses within the network. Thus the photon is not converted out of
the optical domain and hence is not destroyed.
Present QKD systems also require dark fibre and hence have a highly inefficient channel
capacity usage. This increases overhead costs and decreases the practicality of the sys-
tem. One method of increasing the throughput of data and hence the usage efficiency
is through Wavelength Division Multiplexing (WDM). We discuss the above in greater
detail in this section.
4.1 Classical Networks
4.1.1 Network Layers
Modern network architecture follows a layered structure derived from a service-orientated
approach. Each network layer provides functionality to the layer directly above it inde-
pendent of the implementation. One such network model is the International Standards
Organization’s Open System Interconnection (OSI) Model [51]. It was first proposed in
1979 by Day and Zimmermann and was adopted as an international standard in 1983.
[51].
The OSI model consists of 7 network layers detailed below:
Layer 7: Application layer
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This is the layer that creates the user interface for the network. It consists of the
common protocols used in network communication.
Layer 6: Presentation layer
This layer allows for the compatibility and translation of varying data structures
to be transported over a common network. This layer also provides a platform for
classical encryption of data.
Layer 5: Session layer
Communication sessions between stations may be setup throught this layer. This
defines and manages the protocol to be followed by the computers during the
session.
Layer 4: Transport layer
This layer defines and creates packets for data transfer. It is responsible to provide
a hardware independent interface to the software layers.
Layer 3: Network layer
The optimal routing of data throught the network is controled throught the net-
work layer. Different types of routing standards may be applied according to the
Quality of Service of the network.
Layer 2: Data link layer
The software machinery for data transfer is provided by this layer. Error correction
and conflict resolution are some of the responsibilities of this layer.
Layer 1: Physical layer
This layer consists of the underlying hardware of the network. It is used to create
the physical links between end-users and to define the standards used for bit
transfers.
It is interesting to note that general classical encryption is software driven and hence
implemented through layer 6 [51] although some encryptors work at lower levels. QKD
is hardware implemented and is thus embedded within the bottom two layers. This
in itself illustrates the superior security of quantum cryptography as the security is
embedded in physical quantum particles as opposed to computer algorithms.
The network layer offers two main types of network services, these are connection-
orientated and connectionless links between nodes. In a connectionless (CL) or packet
switching service the message is broken into small packets of data that are switched
through the network depending on the destination and congestion of lightpaths. A
connection orientated (CO) or circuit switched network establishes a dedicated lightpath
between the two end-users before any data is transferred. Hybrid services such as Multi
Protocol Label Switching (MPLS) are also available. This breaks the message up into
small packets, the first packet is switched as in a CL network, however the other packets
then follow the same lightpath as the first. This type of switching however does not
utilize dedicated lightpaths and hence may be prone to congestion at switches.
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CL and MPLS networks are not feasible for QKD at present due to line congestion.
This due to the fact that if a packet is required to be switched through a congested line
it would require temporary storage. With present technology this would require the
photon to undergo conversion from the optical to electrical domain and would hence be
destroyed.
Layers four to seven are essentially software orientated, a quantum network requires
a new implementation in layers 1-3. Presently pure quantum cryptography has been
implemented within layer 1 and 2 as point-to-point links. The focus of the remainder
of this chapter will be on creating a layer 3 for the quantum network.
4.1.2 Multiplexing
Multiplexing in terms of networking is the division of channel capacity through some
means to allow for concurrent multiple usage of the channel. Many methods of mul-
tiplexing have been investigated and are presently deployed in networks. Optical net-
works have a unique multiplexing technique knows as Wavelength Division Multiplexing
(WDM).
WDM permits signals to be sent through a fibre optic cable at varying frequencies. Due
to the wave nature of the signals they do not generally interfere with the propagation of
each other, further techniques exist for the separation of waves of varying frequencies.
This allows signals of such type to be sent through a single fibre simultaneously, hugely
increasing the capacity of the channel. As the technique and equipment for frequency
separation improves, the capacity will also increase. This however can not continue in-
definitely as a build up of light intensity causes non-linear effects to arise. This method
in essence creates many virtual lightpaths within a single fibre.
WDM was introduced with the development of second-generation optical networks. This
scheme allows one to send non-interfering pulses of different wavelengths carrying in-
dependent information through a single optical fibre simultaneously. The process also
allows for all-optical ultrafast network switching.
A list of optical networking components relevant to QKD are presented below:
Optical couplers
These devices merge or split two incident light signals into one or more output
light signals through fibre fusion. The proportion of coupling may be adjusted
to ones specifications. The coupling constant may be wavelength dependent or
independent. Such devices are used in many applications such as interferometers.
Isolators and circulators
These are unidirectional devices. Insulators have a low forward attenuation and
an extremely high reverse directional attenuation. Circulators are multi-port insu-
lators that only permit pulses from a certain input fiber to be outputted through
its adjacent fiber in either a clockwise or anticlockwise direction.
Wavelength filters
Wavelength filters permit only a certain bandwidth of pulses to pass through the
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device. The remainder of the wavelengths are outputted through an additional
exit fibre. These devices are the basis of Optical Add/Drop Multiplexers (OADM).
Wavelength dependent multiplexers (WM) and demultiplexers (WD)
Multiplexers split a multi-wavelength signal traveling on a single fiber into many
single wavelength signals over individual fibres. Demultiplexers are the inverse of
multiplexers, thus creating a multi wavelength signal from many single wavelength
signals. Such devices are used extensively in WDM.
Optical cross-connects (OXC)
Such devices demultiplex two or more input fibers into their constituent single
wavelength signals, then reconstruct a multi-wavelength output signals using a
combination of the decoupled single wavelength signals.
Optical add/drop multiplexers (OADM)
The addition or removal of a signal of a certain wavelength into or from a multi-
wavelength signal is achieved with the use of such devices. They are a created by
a sequence of multiplexers, demultiplexers, circulators and Bragg gratings [38].
Optical switches (OS)
This is an all-optical component to perform the general switching within the net-
work.
In section 4.2.2 we propose the use WDM with the aforementioned components in the
realization of passive optical networks (PON) as quantum networks.
4.2 Quantum Network Architectures
4.2.1 Classification
Quantum networks maybe divided into trusted or untrusted networks. Trusted networks
utilize relays to increase spatial coverage of the network. This is implemented through
nodes acting as trusted servers or through a hop-by-hop process where a series of nodes
operate as relays. Such a service introduces redundant lightpaths between nodes, thus
increasing the robustness against DoS attacks and decreasing the information about
key distribution relations. The use of relays facilitates heterogeneous quantum channels
within a network. The relays used in this type of environment are assumed to be trusted,
however this has great implications on the security of the network.
Untrusted networks consist of all-optical lightpaths linking nodes solely through optical
networking components. The qubits are neither amplified nor converted between varying
domains. The QKD distance between nodes is limited as in the two-node QKD setup,
however the network coverage may be large. The distribution limit may in fact reduce
due to the insertion losses by routing components within the network. In such a system,
48 4. Quantum Networks
Fig. 4.1: A block diagram of a Bus network topology. Each node is connected to the backbone
fibre via an OADM and an optical switch (OS). Each node is assigned wavelength as
an address.
one is not required to assume security for any part of the network and is thus ideal for
ultra security.
4.2.2 Different architectures and topologies
Quantum networks may be realised as a number of classical network architectures.
This decstationc focuses on wavelength routed passive optical networks (WRPON). The
significance of developing QNs around classical architectures is for the transparency of
these backbone networks in present day communication. Quantum implementations of
some of the most common classical architectures are presented in the following pages.
Bus topology
This topology implements full-duplex communication and is an example of a Quantum
WRPON. Each node is a transceiver and are connected to the bus line via an OADM
and circulator as shown in Figure 4.1.
Each node is assigned a specific wavelength. The OADM filters out any pulses received
at the node’s allocated wavelength. These pulses are directed to the detectors via a
circulator. If the node would like to distribute a secure key between another node, the
tunable laser is set to the specific wavelength and routed through the bus line via OADM
and OS. The latter is used to ensure the photons are routed in the correct direction
along the bus line.
The major advantage of such network architecture is that in is easy scalability of the
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network. Adding a new user amounts to the allocation of wavelengths to the new nodes.
This type of network would use minimal fiber lines and hence would be cost effective.
The coverage of the network would be limited to the ‘quantum limit’ (∼=100km) between
the users of either end of the bus line. The use of nodes as trusted relays will enhance
the coverage of the network. The bus topology is venerable to DoS attacks, such attacks
would create two sub-networks, denying service between nodes in the different sub net-
works.
The use of a tunable laser and one set of detectors disallows for one node to perform
independent QKD with a number of nodes simultaneously. To overcome such a bot-
tleneck, a dedicated laser and photodetectors for each wavelength would be needed.
However these would imply a lack of scalability thus increasing costs and maintenance
complexity. The bus topology may be realized as a trusted or untrusted network. This
architecture has been experimentally realized [52].
Ring topology
The ring topology is constructed as in the case of the bus topology with the ‘ends’ of
the bus line linked, thus forming a ring. The hardware implementation is as that of the
bus topology. The ring topology provides two routes between nodes due to the circular
architecture. Thus it has better resistance to a DoS attack. A break in the ring line
would render the network a bus topology. The topology allows for a wider coverage
than the bus topology, although the maximum distance between two nodes without
trusted relays would be in the region of the ‘quantum limit’. The installation costs,
maintenance complexity and QoS are all similar to that of the bus topology.
Mesh topology
In the mesh network topology the nodes are considerably inter-connected. A four node
mesh topology is illustrated in Figure 4.2. Each node again consists of a tunable laser
and a set of photodetectors connected via a circulator. Each node is connected to the
network through a WM. An OS is placed at the interconnection of the diagonal fibers
to facilitate rerouting if a fiber link is down. A mesh topology is generally used as a
backbone network on which a complex classical network is built. For example, the nodes
shown in Figure 4.2 may be gateways to secure LANs.
This type of network utilizes CO routing. Each lightpath is allocated a unique wave-
length. In order to distribute a key between two nodes, the laser is tuned to the
respective wavelength, the photons are then routed through the optical components to
the receiver. The meshed architecture creates a great number of redundant lightpaths
ensuring such a topology is robust to a DoS attack. However the mesh architecture
results in an increase of optical components, hence increases the insertion losses of the
system, reducing the spatial coverage. The meshed topology also requires many route
miles of fibre-optics. This firstly accelerates the cost of installation and also reduces the
50 4. Quantum Networks
Fig. 4.2: A block diagram of a mesh network topology. In such an architecture the nodes are
considerably interconnected creating many redundant light paths between nodes.
efficiency of fiber utilization.
Additional nodes may compel extra cabling and the reassignment of lightpath wave-
lengths. Mesh topology networks may be used as trusted networks, with the nodes
acting as active relays, or as an untrusted network.
Star topology
The star topology with a trusted server is shown in Figure 4.3. This type of architecture
is the simpliest quantum network to realize [53]. Its architecture implements simplex
key exchange between the server and peripheral nodes and is again based on WRPON
architecture. The server consists of a tunable laser while the nodes each contain a set
of photodetectors. Each node is assigned a wavelength. The photons for the respective
wavelengths are routed through a WM.
The two nodes that require a distribution of a secure key between them first request for
a distribution of a secure key with the trusted server. The server would then, in turn,
encrypt the first key with the second and send the encrypted file to the second user.
The second node would decrypt the file and a secure key would be effectively distributed
between the two nodes.
Such a topology is prone to DoS attacks as a node is completely isolated if the connec-
tion to the server is severed. The server, as mentioned previously, is assumed secure, as
any type of mole within the server would lead to a compromise in the entire network’s
security.
The effective RKR in such a topology would be reduced by a factor of two. This is due
to the fact that each QKD between two nodes is the resultant of two key distributions
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Fig. 4.3: A block diagram of the trusted star topology. All key distribution is implemented
through the server. Thus the server must be assumed secure. A compromise in the
server will result in a compromise in all communication.
that may not be performed simultaneously due to the tunable laser in the server. This
may be overcome with the replacement of the tunable laser with DFB lasers at specific
wavelengths for each user.
Such a substitution is feasible as inserting additional nodes into the network would re-
quire a hardware adaptation of the server only. Thus the addition would be transparent
to all other users. Network maintenance of this architecture would be centralized to the
server as all end users would contain only passive equipment. Installation costs would
be less than other protocols due to fewer technologies embedded within each node.
The network coverage without additional trusted relays would encompass an area of
diameter twice the quantum limit. This is because the trusted server acts as a relay
between nodes.
If the server is installed with DFB lasers, continuous simultaneous QKD may be per-
formed between the server and all nodes. The keys then stored in a secure key storage.
Thus when two nodes require a secure key, the server may instantaneously encrypt
and distribute the key as described above. Thus providing a means of key-on-demand
communication.
Untrusted star topology
A star topology may also be realized without the use of a trusted server. In this case
the server is replaced by an OXC and each node is assigned a wavelength. The OXC
acts as a router to direct the photons to the correct nodes as per the wavelength. A
schematic representation of the setup is shown in Figure 4.4.
Due to the star topology, this setup is again extremely vulnerable to DoS attacks as
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Fig. 4.4: A block diagram of a untrusted star network topology. A quantum WRPON is achieved
in this architecture through optical cross-connects. Such an architecture can also be
realized with optical switches and a classical control layer. However this may provide
vital key relation information to the eavesdropper.
explained previously and has limited spatial coverage. The addition of a new node into
the network requires a fibre connection to the OXC and a wavelength assignment to the
node.
A layered QN would allow for for a classical layer to control the routing techniques
through electronically controlled optical switches (MEMS). Such routing would again
have to remain as CO. However this type of routing technique would expose the key
distribution relations.
4.2.3 Plug & Play Architecture
While the QKD systems implementing the auto-compensating system have advantages
in a 2 point QKD setup, they introduce limitations in QNs. These limitations arise as
the laser and detectors are both placed in one unit (Bob) and the photons are required
to return from Alice along the same lightpath as Bob sent them. Network components
may not reverse polarization effects on the return trip, thus causing an error in the
interferometeric readings.
These systems can only be used with a CO network due to the common lightpath
required for transmission during QKD. Modifications to node hardware are specific to
the implemented topology.
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4.2.4 eThekwini Municipal Quantum Network
As a subsiquent development to the Durban - Smart City project, the eThekwini Mu-
nicipality funded the Quantum Research Group (QRG) for the development of the first
municipal quantum network in the world. The network will initially consist of a 3-4
node setup to form the backbone infrastructure linking the municipal switching offices
to internal and other commercial customers. Two network architectures have been re-
searched as part of the Quantum City project. Both the proposed networks will be
implemented as trusted architectures.
The intial network hardware will consist of the Cerberis QKD solution [47] for id Quan-
tique. This is a phase-encoded photonic Plug & Play QKD system implementing the
BB84 and SARG protocols. The QRG will be adding other systems to the network in
future layouts.
The primary objective of this research is to develop quantum networks to a commercially
viable option and further the development of communication standards for QKD.
The first quantum network envisaged is a four-node star architecture as shown in Figure
4.5. The central node of the star topology is assumed to be safe and hence trusted.
The central node will be a municipal switching office from which the spokes of the net-
work will link the peripheral nodes. Each peripheral node consists of a station A of the
cerberis solution while the complementary stations are to be housed in the the server.
Network adaptability and scalability are the main advantages of this architecture. Net-
work expansion will be transparent to all client nodes. Network maintenance will be
centralized to the server node as all end users would contain mostly passive equipment.
A 3-node mesh architecture is also being researched as illustrated in Figure 4.6. This
would inter-connect and secure communication links between the municipal switching
stations. A mesh network creates direct links between each node with the network.
Each node contains both stations of the cerberis system. A pair of optical switches
facilitates the routing between the two stations.
This network may be regarded as an untrusted network as no intermediary node is
required for communication between end-users under normal circumstances.
The implementation of this network is intended to be realised during the third quarter
of 2008. The intention is to create a basic setup and expand the network in the future
to offer its services to other interested parties in the corporate sector.
After the implementation of the quantum network and general encryption of the net-
work traffic other pronounced applications will be investigated. The enhancement of
QKD through networking techniques will also be pursued. The integration of other
QKD solutions will further allow us to create standards and models for quantum com-
munications.
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Trusted Server
 Cerbris (Station A)  LAN  Optical Switch
 Cerbris (Station B)   Server
Fig. 4.5: Schematic diagram of the trusted star network topology envisaged to be implemented
into the eThekwini Municipal optical network in the third quarter of 2008. The network
will use the Cerberis QKD solution.
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 Cerbris (Station A)  LAN  Optical Switch
 Cerbris (Station B)   Server
Fig. 4.6: Schematic diagram of the Mesh Network Topology.
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5. INTENDED RESEARCH ON QUANTUM NETWORKS
The networking procedure outlined in the previous sections essentially facilitates net-
work enabled QKD through a layer 3 implementation, however this still lacks some
essential properties required for full commercial use. These, amongst others, include
the financial viability for such implementations. In this section we present a few issues
presently limiting quantum networks and enumerate on research we intend to undertake
on the municipal quantum network.
As has been noted previously the quantum nature of the key distribution has intrinsic
and technical limitations. Through wavelength division multiplexed quantum networks
many of the obstacles are overcome. However besides the technical complications of
such an implementation further research is required in the following aspects:
1. Presently dark fibre is required for all available QKD systems. This is highly
inefficient. A dark fibre used solely for classical cryptography could also enhance
the security considerably through numerous parallel key exchanges and a complex
function to derive a final key from the raw exchanged keys, this would provide for
a much higher key production rate. The optimization of fibre capacity usage in
QKD is dependent on the quality of the fibre as well as the networking components.
The fibre limitations are concentrated around non-linear effects occurring through
a buildup of component waves within the fibre. These effects are limited in QKD
as an accumulation of single photon pulses in every frequency of the ITU grid
will not create an intensity that will pass the threshold required for the creation
of non-linear effects. The insertion loss due to WMD equipment does however
play a significant role in limiting the number of concurrent QKD signals in a
particular fibre. The first and more obvious reasoning for this is the increased
attenuation resulting in a shorter spacial coverage. Further WDM devices have a
finite crosstalk suppression and hence leakage may occur between channels creating
false detections and increasing QBER. This problem is enhanced if a common fibre
is used for both quantum and classical communications.
2. PONs are the center of current research in the realization of quantum networks
as discussed earlier. This method however does not efficiently utilize the poten-
tial throughput of the network. An actively routed quantum network could be
realized through an array of optical switches or crossconnects interconnecting the
quantum layer of the network overlayed by a classical control network to facilitate
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Multi-Protocol Label Switching. This, coupled with the aforementioned could po-
tentially create commercially feasible quantum networks for the medium to large
enterprize sector.
3. The quantum networks present today rely on trusted nodes to for the enhancement
of spatial coverage. This however creates additional security vulnerabilities. Some
theoretical solutions to this problem have been investigated with entanglement-
based QKD and Quantum Percolation Theory [50]. In essence the proposals state
that if the nodes of a network are sufficiently linked through entangled pairs,
entanglement can be extended between any two nodes through unitary operations
[50]. This however posses great technological challenges and has not as yet been
realized.
4. A secure key management layer is also required to overlay the quantum layer [54].
This layer will be used for increasing key distribution rates is through classical
postprocessing. After a secure key has been distributed through a quantum back-
bone network, the keys are passed onto an overlaying classical network layer.
This network layer expands, manages and stores primary distributed keys through
other quantum phenomena. This has the potential of producing key distribution
rates comparable with classical key distribution. Presently some QKD solutions,
such as the Cerberis solution [47], has partially implemented this layer. The key
expansion and management is conducted through classical means such as the AES
expansion. This however produces computationally secure keys.
We intend to pursue many of the aforementioned through the eThekwini Municipal
Quantum Network. Quantum networks based on percolation theory require entangle-
ment based QKD and is hence beyond the scope of the presently implemented network.
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Quantum cryptography has developed an entire field of research around itself merging
together quantum mechanics and information theory to form Quantum Information Sci-
ence. Its development has further been propelled by the rapid enhancement of quantum
optics and fibre optic technology.
Present technological challenges mainly revolve around detection efficiencies and fibre
attenuation. These factors limit the rate and distance of quantum key distribution. The
recent interest into the deployment of quantum networks have been to address factors
that are hindering the mass commercialization of quantum cryptography.
This thesis has presented a brief outline of classical cryptography and an introduction to
quantum cryptography. It has also expounded on present day quantum cryptographic
systems, some improvements to quantum cryptographic protocols, possible architectures
for Quantum Passive Optical Networks and intended research into the commercially fea-
sible quantum networks.
Classical cryptography, due to its deterministic nature and dependency on assumed
complexity, renders it at most computationally secure. Technologically independent se-
cure communication may be realized through quantum cryptography. The security of
this cryptosystem lies in the physical properties of the quantum information carriers.
Some commercially produced quantum cryptographic solutions are available presently.
These, although offering future-proof secure key distribution, fall short of the data
capacity requirements of present data communication and standards. To fulfill such
requirements both the quantum protocols and the physical implementation needs im-
provements.
Most Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols have a relatively low sifting effi-
ciency, hence many successfully distributed qubits are left unused. The enhanced BB84
protocol proposed in this thesis is a minimally computer intensive, post-distribution
algorithm that permits the recycling of qubits to enhance the efficiency of the original
protocol. The key advantage of such a system is that no physical alterations are required
to the system. Further any implementation of the BB84 protocol can be enhanced in
the manner described.
It is shown that through an IKE algorithm and a modified interpretation of the BB84
setup, the sifting efficiency is increased by 40% from the standard BB84 protocol. In
general the recycling of unwanted qubits through various analytical means will permit
highly efficient QKD algorithms with relatively simple setups.
Quantum networks are the second-generation quantum cryptographic solutions. These
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provide further Quality of Service to the end-users by enhancing the distribution process
and increasing the efficiency of the infrastructure usage thus lowering the implementa-
tion cost of QKD.
Simple Wavelength Routed Passive Optical Networks as a first order implementation of
quantum networks. However multi layered quantum networks with quantum communi-
cation standards are required to be appended to their classical counterparts to facilitate
practical quantum cryptography.
7. APPENDICES
7.1 Appendix A - List of Abbreviations
Acronym Abbreviation
AES Advanced Encryption Standard




DoS Denial of Service
IKE Iterative Key Exchange
ITU International Telecommunication Union
MAN Municipal Area Network
MEMS Micro-Electro-Mechanical Systems
MPLS Multi Protocol Label Switching
MQT Minimal Qubit Tomography
OADM Optical Add/Drop Multiplexers
QRG Quantum Research Group
OSI Open System Interconnection
OTP One Time Pad
OXC Optical Crossconnect
PMD Polarization Mode Dispersion
PON Passive Optical Network
QBER Quantum Bit Error Rate
QKD Quantum Key Distribution
QN Quantum Networks
QoS Quality of Service
QPON Quantum Passive Optical Network
QRNG Quantum Random Number Generator
QS-A Quantum Station Alice
QS-B Quantum Station Bob
RKR Raw Key Rate
WD Wavelength Division Demultiplexers
WDM Wavelength Division Multiplexing
WM Wavelength Division Multiplexers
WRPON Wavelength Routed Passive Optical Network
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